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RIVER BASINS 
OF MAINE 
Introduction to the River and the Controversy 
From its headwaters in the mountains of western Maine, 
the St. John River flows for 400 miles across northern 
Maine and into Canada where it flows to the sea at St. 
John, New Brunswick, The upper 130 miles of the St. John 
River flow through the remotest section of Maine' s forest 
wilderness. Most of the 2,725 square miles drained by this 
upper river, in Maine and Canada, are heavily forested and 
owned exclusively by the forest products industry. Land 
ownership in the Upper St. John River basin follows the 
characteristic pattern prevailing throughout the Maine wood-
lands, with vast tracts of forest acreage, owned by a few 
major corporations, interspersed with the comparatively 
minor holdings of many smaller companies. Four paper com-
panies dominate tie Upper St. John River basin: Great 
northern Paper Company and International Paper Company own 
large blocks of territory in the headwaters area, with 
scattered holdings downstream, while to the north Irving 
Pulp and Paper Limited and the Pingree Heirs are the major 
land owners. Settlement has never occurred in the unor-
ganized townships of this section of Maine so the popula-
tion is. sparse and no permanent communities exist. No 
public roads penetrate the interior forest area. Automo-
bile access is seasonal and restricted to a network of 
private gravel roads maintained and controlled by the paper 
companies. A large part of this wilderness can be reached 
only by canoe, airplane or on foot. 
Below its confluence with the Allagash, the wilderness 
nature of the Upper St. John Valley undergoes a transition 
as the river emerges from the uninhabited woodlands. Prom 
at. Francis, Maine, to Grand Falls, New Brunswick, a dis-
tance of over 80 miles, the St. John defines the interna-
tional boundary, flowing through a series of border towns 
and rich agricultural country. At Hamlin, Maine, the river 
spills over Grand Falls and begins its 200-mile passage to 
its outlet in the Bay of Fundy. 
There are two St* John Rivers: the Upper river130 
miles long from its headwaters to the village of Dickey, in 
the Allagash plantation, and the "Lower" St. John, begin-
ning where the river emerges from the wilderness and ending 
at its outlet to the sea* 
The Upper St. John is a wild river, free from pollu-
tion or obstruction, its waters and valley rich in fish and 
wildlife. Yet the Upper St. John is no pristine wilderness. 
Supporting a variety of wilderness associated activities, 
the river has a renowned native trout fishery, supplies 
critical wintering habitat for Maine's most popular game 
animal, the white-tail deer, is a hunting and trapping 
ground, a challenging and popular canoeing stream, and, as 
a thriving timber plantation, is a source of raw materials 
for the forest products industry which is Maine's largest 
single employer. 
The Lower St. John, on the other hand, is characterised 
by human settlement and activity* From Ft* Kent to the sea, 
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towns are spaced along the banks of the St* John River, 
end the intervals between the towns are spanned by roads 
that steadfastly parallel the rivers banks. Most of the 
towns and industries dump their wastes into the river, and 
certain stretches are severely polluted* The Maine Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, in March, 1973, announced 
that it considers the Lower St* John River, in certain 
parts, to be "water quality limited", a term used to de-
scribe water so polluted that lit cannot be improved to meet 
standards of acceptability by the best available means of 
waste treatment* In New Brunswick, at Fredericton and 
Hartland, two hydroelectric dams have converted the river 
into Iong narrow lakes* Fully two thirds of the length of 
the St* John River has been "civilized" in this fashion* 
Only one third of the river remains wild and intact* 
Bat the Upper part of the St* John River has been 
threatened in the last two decades by the forces of growth 
expansion which require the consumption of the remain-
ing "underutilized" wilderness resources at an acceler-
ating pace. This remote forest area of northern Maine 
has been caught up in the intensifying competition between 
to preserve wild areas, and demands to tap the 
energy resources that these areas harbor* Over the past 
fifteen years the construction of a Federally-financed 
hydroelectric project on the Upper St* John River has been 
planned, debated, approved, revised, defeated, and revived* 
Just as the original Federal proposal for a dam that would 
have flooded the Allagash as well as the St* John provoked 
protest and spurred measures to protect the wilderness 
qualities of the Allagash, so the plan for flooding the 
Upper St, John has provoked increasing controversy over 
what constitutes the best use of that area. For, although 
the St. John drains the heart of the privately-owned paper 
company domain, the river itself belongs to the state of 
Maine, and should, therefore, be used in a manner that 
promotes the welfare of Maine people. 
At this time, the Dickey-Lincoln issue is just one of 
several unresolved issues which have direct bearing on the 
future of the Upper St. John River. The controversy sur-
rounding the Federal development of the upper St. John 
River for hydroelectric power production is clouded by a 
number of overlapping issues, each one posing a complex 
problem in itself. The Dickey-Lincoln question has become 
entangled with the "energy crisis", the merits of public 
versus private utility operation, and the question of who 
will determine the future land-use of Maine's ten million 
acres of unorganized territory. Dickey-Lincoln is just one 
among many possible ways of developing the Upper St. John 
Rlver. The question of whether the Dickey-Lincoln project 
should or should not be constructed is really part of a 
larger question: what use of the Upper St. John River 
would best promote the economic, environmental, and social 
well-being of the people of Maine? 
With this question as a guide, this report was under-
taken primarily to evaluate the impact that the construction 
of the Dickey-Lincoln project would have upon the resources 
of the Upper St. John River, and to examine the assertion 
that the Dickey-Lincoln project constitutes a wise use of 
the public*s environmental and economic resources. Since 
the case that has been made for the construction of the 
Dickey-Lincoln project rest primarily on the justification 
of the project in economic terms, this aspect of the project 
proposal will be intensively explored* 
PART I-Description of the Dickey-Lincoln Project 
The concept of a Federal hydroelectric project on the 
Upper St. John River grew out of the need for auxiliary 
power to supplement the proposed Passamaquoddy Tidal Power 
Project. First outlined in the 1920's by an American en-
gineer, Dexter Cooper, the Quoddy tidal power project was 
revived in the late 1950*s by the Department of the Interior. 
Extensive engineering and economic studies proved the tidal 
project to be feasible from an engineering standpoint, but 
not on economic grounds. The Upper St. John River hydro-
electrlc proposal, however, was found to be economically 
sound if developed as a separate project. Of the several 
Upper St* John River sites studied, the one having the great-
est hydro potential was found to be Rankin Rapids, located 
downstream from the Allagash and St* John River confluence. 
That site was later rejected, in response to pressure 
against flooding the Allagash* The Dickey site, located on 
the St* John, just upstream from the Allagash-St* John 
junction, was selected as the best alternate* 
According to the Department of the Interior Army 
Corps of Engineers' plan, formulated in the early I960's 
and authorized by Congress in 1965» the Dickey-Lincoln pro-
jeot would create impoundments behind two dams: the main 
Dickey dam, and a smaller re-regulating dam 11 miles down-
etream.at Lincoln School* * The Dickey dam would be 
*U.S. Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John F. Kennedy. The 1 assaiaaquoddy Tidal t-owor Project and 
Upcor St. Joiin Kiver i^droeloctric .Dcvelopacnt. July. 1963f p.Vo. 
9,260 ft. long, rising 340 ft. above the river bed. The 
Lincoln School Dam would measure 1,290 ft. long, and 87 ft. 
high. 2 
Army Corps of Engineers' plans call for both dams to 
be of the earthfill type, the main dam requiring 65 million 
cubic yards of fill and the Lincoln School dam requiring 
2.2 million cubic yards of fill. ^  Five dikes necessary 
to prevent spillover from the main reservoir into the ad-
jacent river basins, would require an additional 10 million 
cubic yards of fill. * It has been said that if built, the 
Dickey-Lincoln complex would be the eleventh largest dam in 
the world, the sixth largest in the United States, and in 
total volume of structure, larger than the Aswan Dam. ** 
Preliminary surveys made by the Corps of Engineers in-
dicate that the immense quantity of fill necessary can be 
obtained locally at all sites. ^  The extensive glacial de-
posits that cover the valley would be the source of perme-
able and impermeable fill, while the slaty shale bedrock of 
the region would provide most of the rock required for rock-
fills and slope protection. Where the rock slope on the 
face of the dam would be exposed to fluctuating water levels 
and freezing and thawing, a rock more resistant than shale 
to weathering would be required. High quality, durable 
U.S. Army Engineer Division, New England Corps of En-
gineers, Supplement to July 1963 Report: The International 
Passaoaquoddy Tidal Power Project and Upper St. John River 
Hydroelectric Power Development, Engineering Report. 
April 1, 1964, p.3. 
^Ibid., p.3. 4Ibid., p.29. 
^Sleeper, Arthur, Portland Press Herald. July 18, 1965. 
^U.S.Army Engineer Division, Supplement to July, 1963 
Report, op. cit., p.30. 
granitic rock, suitable for slope facing and for the pro-
duction of concrete aggregate would be quarried at 
Deboullie Mountain, an 18-mile Haul from the Dickey dam 
site. ' The Deboullie granite is the only major occur-
Q 
rence of resistant igneous rock in the region* 
Hydrologic studies of the St. John River were under-
taken by the Corps of Engineers to determine the potential 
regulated flow available at the Dickey site. Records of 
the volume of streamflow in the Upper St. John River have 
been kept since 1946, at a gauging station two miles up-
stream from the Dickey dam site. The average annual 
streamflow, which corresponds to the potential regulated 
flow, at that point is 4,600 cubic feet per second (c.f.s. 
Although the streamflow In the Upper St. John follows a 
normal seasonal pattern, the heavy snowfall of northern 
Maine, plus the lack of extensive natural storage in the 
St. John headwaters, combine to produce torrentially high 
flows in the spring (as high as 70,000 c.f.s.) and dras-
tically low flows during July, August and September 
(record low of 129 c.f.s.). 
The function of the reservoir would be to even out 
seasonally irregular streamflow, impounding the flows in 
excess of the annual average, 4»600 c.f.s., to be released 
during periods of lower than average streamflow* The 
^U*S.Army Engineers Division, Supplement to July 1963 
Report, op. olt., p.33. 
^Ibld*, p.17. 
U.S.Department of the Interior, Geological Survey-
Water Resources Division, Water Resources Data for Maine. 
1266, Part I: Surface Water Records. l^bY. p*ll. 
maximum reservoir drawdown (the maximum distance that the 
water in the reservoir can be lowered when water is with-
drawn for power generation) planned is 40 ft., which pro-
Tides 2.9 million acre-feet of active storage capacity* 
This active storage capacity corresponds to a regulated 
flow of 4,370 c.f.s* 1 1 Since the flow of the St. John at 
the dam site averages 4,600 c.f.e*, it appears that the 
Dickey dam is planned for near maximum size to control 95^ 
of that flow* 
There ie only a limited quantity of potential energy 
in a river at any one site, depending upon the volume of 
streamflow. A hydroelectric dam stores the potential 
energy of river flows and converts it into electrical 
energy. Kilowatts of electricity are a produot of the 
amount of flow times the head (or drop)* With an average 
head of 290 ft* and the rather low average flow of 4,600 
c*f*s«t there is only enough potential energy in the St. 
John River at the Dlokey site to run a generating unit of 
95,000 kilowatts* This is the "prime power" in the St. John 
Hirer at that point* Operating continuously, an installa-
tion of that size could produce about 830 million kilowatt-
12 hours (KWH) per year of baseload power* 
But if, Instead of continuous operation, the potential 
energy stored behind the Dickey dam were released in larger 
.Anqy Engineers Division, Supplement to July. 1963 
Report, op. cit., p.58. 
**John £5* Wilkinson, "ITew England's Power Developments: 
Fart II . . . Public Power Proposals", New inland Businoss 
Review. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research Department, 
April, 1966, p*9. 
quantities for shorter tine intervals, peaking power could 
be produced instead of baseload power. This is the oper-
ating procedure planned for the Dickey dam, which would 
have an installed generating capacity of 760,000 kilowatts. 
The Dickey dam and power house is sized for operating 
periods of hours each day, equivalent to a plant factor 
of U^. Approximately the same number of kilowatt-hours 
per year of energy (830 million KWH) would be produced 
under either operating procedure, however, because the total 
output is governed directly by the flow in the river. 
Cast in this light, the true value of the St. John as 
a hydroelectric resource appears to be less mammoth than 
when generating capacity figures alone are oited. If oper-
ated at 50$ plant factor, for the production of baseload 
power, a generating capacity of 190,000 kilowatts would pro-
vide adequate conversion ability. 
During peaking power operation of the Dickey dam, 
large surges of water would be released downstream* The 
function of the re-regulating dam at Lincoln School is to 
re-Impound and release these surges evenly, 34,000 kilo-
watts of generating capacity would be Installed at Lincoln 
School to be operated for the production of baseload power 13 
at a high (87^) plant factor. The production of baseload 
power at Dickey-Lincoln appears to be coincidental to the 
need for re-regulation of peaking releases and maintenance 
of "1 r* ™ B stream flows. 
^U.S. Array Engineer Division, Supplement to July 1963 
Report, op. cit., p.81* 
The reservoir capacity of the Lincoln School dam must 
be sufficient for the re-regulation of the flows from the 
Dickey dam, but the size of the reservoir, and, hence, the 
generating capacity of the Lincoln School power plant, is 
restricted by two factors: the re-regulating reservoir can-
not encroach upon the Dickey spillway discharge channel, 
end it cannot encroach upon Allagash Palls, a natural bar-
rier protecting the Allagash River. These limitations on 
the elze of the Lincoln School reservoir mean that the 
flows from the Dickey dam and from the "uncontrolled drain-
age area of 1,300 miles" of the Allagash River basin, can-
not be fully utilized for the production of electrio power.14 
At full pool (910 ft. above mean sea level) m.s.l. 
the Dickey reservoir would extend 5T miles up the St. John 
River to the area known as Seven Islands. The backwater 
would reach 25 miles up the Little Black River, and 23 milee 
15 
up the Shields Branch of the Big Black River. 
A total of 110,000 acres would be used for the project. 
The Dickey reservoir itself, at full pool, would occupy 
889600 acres. At minimum pool, the reservoir would occupy 
58,000 acres. Daily fluctuations in the reservoir pool 
level would occur in response to the peaking power operation. 
Approximately 2,000 acres would be required for work areas 
at the <*nTn and saddle dikes, including access routes and 
borrow areas. A 300-foot wide buffer zone and access strip 
.Amy Engineer Division, Supplement to July 1963 
Report, op. cit., p.76. 
""^Ibid., p.67. 
would b© acquired around the perimeter of the reservoir. 
A borrow area of 20 acres at Deboullie Mountain for granite 
quarrying is also projected. 1 6 
The coordinated operation of the two dams would re-
quire excavating a new channel for the lower end of the 
Allagaeh River. The deep curve in the Allagash channel, 
just before it enters the St. John, would be straightened 
to accommodate the tailrace from the Dickey power house. 
One mile up the straightened channel, the Dickey spillway 
discharge channel, which handles reservoir overflows, would 
empty into the Allagash. 
Almost all of the land that would be inundated by the 
formation of the reservoir pool is held in large tracts for 
pulpwood cutting. Ninety-nine per cent of the population 
in the project area is concentrated in Diokey, a hamlet of 
about 700 people, therefore, relocations will not be exten-
sive. 
Negotiations with the Canadian government would be 
necessary before construction of the Dickey-Lincoln project 
since two arms of the Diokey reservoir encroach upon 
Canadian territory. Moreover, the seasonal pattern of 
flow in the Lower St. John would be altered by the regula-
tion of the upper portion of the watershed by the Dickey 
dam* Although no power dams exist on the Lower St. John 
within Maine, three power installations at Grand Falls, 
Mactaquao and Beechwood have been built on the St* John 
"u.s .Army Engineer Division, Supplement to July 1963 
fleport. op. cit., p. 67-68. 
ill Canada. Dickey-Lincoln would act as controlled storage 
for these plants, and by smoothing out the naturally 
erratio flows from the Upper river, would enhance down-
stream production at New Brunswick hydroelectrio power 
plants by about 350 million KWII per year. 1 7 
A modification of the Dickey-Lincoln project has been 
proposed, and 350,000 appropriated to study that proposal 
as of August, 1973. The modified project would produce 
power primarily for a Maine market, its generating capacity 
to be sized for the production of baseload power at roughly 
100,000 kilowatts. The economio and engineering facts of 
the smaller project can only be estimated by Interpolating 
from the full-scale Dickey-Lincoln project. The changes in 
the engineering features such as the size of the reservoir, 
the reduction in the size of the dam, the necessity of a 
re-regulating dam have not been analyzed, and, therefore, 
the economic feasibility of the smaller project plan is 
also unknown. 
Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John P. Kennedy. July, 1363, op. cit., p.73-
PART II-The Resources of the Dickey-Lincoln Project Area 
Evaluations of the Dickey-Lincoln project have been 
largely confined to examining the economic and engineering 
feasibility of the projeot, while glossing over the en-
vironmental aspects. The procedure for determination of 
the soundness of a Federal water resource projeot Is pre-
scribed by Senate Document #97, which essentially requires 
a comparison in dollar terms of the costs and benefits of 
a project. 1 This approach to the evaluation of the merit 
of water resource developments does not lend itself to con-
sideration of the social costs ofc the environmental conse-
quences of the projeot, but is strictly geared to consider-
ation of the direct dollar costs of planning, construction, 
and operation of the power plant and transmission facili-
ties* Nowhere in the highly favorable benefit-cost 
analysis for Dickey-Lincoln, prepared by the Department of 
the Interior and Army Corps of Engineers, is even qualita-
tive consideration given to the environmental costs in-
herent in any hydroelectric power development. 
Two studies deal with the effeots of the Rankin Rapids 
hydroelectric projeot on the fish and wildlife of the 
Allagash and Upper St. John Rivers. Both reports were 
aade before the dam site was changed to Dickey-Lincoln. 
The first, a "Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Pro-
posed Rankin Rapids Dam on the Fisheries of the Upper 
^U.S.Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on rublic Work3, Public ..orl; Ay;j ropriation for 
1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session, ilarch 13, 19o7, 
P. 393* 
St. John River Basin" was prepared by the Maine Department 
of Inland Fisheries and Game in 1957, and revised in I960. 
This report was based on a preliminary investigation under-
taken to collect data on existing aquatio habitat conditions 
to assess the status of the trout populations, and from this 
information to make preliminary evaluations of the effects 
of the proposed Rankin Rapids projeot on the fishery re-
2 
sources of the Upper St. John River. 
A second report was prepared in 1959 by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service, U.S.Department of the Interior, "Substan-
tiating Data for a Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources in 
Relation to the Rankin Rapids Dam and Reservoir." This is 
essentially an expanded version of the Maine agency *s 
"Preliminary Report", broadened in scope to provide infor-
mation on wildlife habitat and populations as well as on the 
fisheries of the Upper St. John-Allagash basins. 
A built at the Rankin Rapids site, located below 
the confluence of the Allagash and St. John, would have 
oaused the inundation of both rivers. The 1959 Federal re-
port appears to have been designed mainly to justify the 
relocation of the dam site from Rankin Rapids to a site on 
the St. John above the mouth of the Allagash, in response 
to strong public reaction against flooding the Allagash. 
As a consequence, the later report is biased, since it 
heavily emphasizes the fish and wildlife and recreation 
2Kendall '.Varner, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries 
and Game, Preliminary Report on the Effects of the Proposed 
Rankin Ha des i-om on t.:o Jis-icrios ox tl.o U - .or at. Jo.m 
"RIver~Basin. 1^7 U'tevioed, l^oQJ, P*2« 
losses that would be incurred by flooding the Allagash, 
while nlnlnl zing the same type of losses that would be 
oaused by flooding the Upper St. John. The dan site was 
changed to a point upstream from the Allagash, as advo-
oated in this report, the Big Rapids site. Later, the 
Dickey site was substituted because of greater site poten-
tial for power generation. 
Both reports are of a preliminary nature, although 
the Pish and Wildlife Services report is subtitled "A 
Detailed Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources'*. Both 
call for future detailed field investigation of the Upper 
St. John fishery and wildlife resources. Acoording to Mr. 
Lyndon Bond, Head of the Fisheries Division of the Maine 
Department of Inland Fisheries and Game, no field work 
on the Upper St. John has been done since I960 and none is 
planned in connection with the Dickey-Lincoln project. ^  
Zn conjunction with the publication of the North 
Atlantic Rerrf.onal Water Resources Study (coordinated by 
the Army Corps of Engineers), in 1972, a Draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement was issued to analyze the impact 
of the water resource development projects which, according 
to the economic and population projections used in the Study, 
will be needed in the St* John River Basin by the year 2,000 
in order to meet the development objectives set forth for 
this region* The key proposal, fulfilling several of the 
^Statement by Lyndon Bond, Maine Department of Inland 
Fisheries and Game, Fisheries Division, personal interview, 
Januazy 30, 1973. 
projeoted water resource needs, i* the development of a 
huge multi-purpose reservoir on the Upper St. John which 
is easily recognizable as the Dickey-Lincoln project. The 
Draft Environmental Impact Statement and the North Atlantic 
Regional Water Resources Study, while providing a revealing 
Insight into the current Corps of Engineers' attitudes 
toward the Dickey-Lincoln projeot, derives its information 
about the environmental resources of the Upper St. John from 
previous studies, probably the two mentioned above, and con-
tributes no new factual information about the effect of 
Dickey-Lincoln on those resources* 
The Fishery of the Up cr St. John Rivor 
The Upper St. John River and its tributaries comprise 
a vast system of streams offering " . . . an almost un-
limited amount of superior seasonal stream habitat for 
brook trout." 4 Compared with the extensive system of 
lakes of the Allagash, pond habitat in the Upper St. John 
River basin is very limited, consisting of a few small 
headwater ponds. Thus, the existing fishery is almost ex-
clusively for brook trout. ^  
Fishing pressure on tlio Upper St. John results prin-
cipally from accessibility. Roads built in connection with 
logging activities have directly opened up much of the 
basin to fishing and canoeing. Stretches on the main 
river and tributaries which are not easily reached from 
the logging roads are accessible by canoe only during high 
water. The "Preliminary Report" describes the use of the 
St. John for fishing generally as "moderate" during spring 
and early summer in terms of a wilderness type of fishing, 
with parts of the river and tributaries near access points 
receiving more intensive utilization. ® 
Brook Trout Habitat 
Brook trout habitat on the Upper St. John and Its 
tributaries approaches ideal conditions for the species. 
^Kendall Warner, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries 
And Game, Preliminary Report on the Effccts of the Proposed 
Rankin Ra^ido JJ.-vn on o.:o .IgI•cries 01 the Upper St. Jolm 
Rivor 13asin, l-jj7 Uevised ISuO;, p.4. 
5Ibid. 6Ibid. 
Water quality is generally exoellent, free from human or 
industrial pollution. The brook trout fishery coexists 
successfully with timber harvesting, the predominant land 
use in the Basin. Slltation problems have occurred in the 
7 
past due mainly to dredging of headwater streams in Canada. 
Logging practices are responsible for some damage to the 
fishery habitat by causing erosion and removal of protective 
shade along stream banks, and by the change in run-off 
patterns created by the deforestation of portions of the 
Basin. 
Both the Allagash and the St. John rivers are consid-
ered to be among the top trout streams in the country. 
Limitations on brook trout habitat in the Upper St. John 
are caused by two conditions: the extreme seasonal fluc-
tuations of water levels in the river, and the obetacles 
to migration at the mouths of many tributary streams. 
Water levele are critical for the quality of fish 
habitat because water temperatures Increase rapidly ae 
flowe diminish. Brook trout cannot tolerate temperatures 
over 70°F without deleterioue metabolic changes. As water 
levele recede, and the water temperature reachee a critical 
point, the trout seek areas of coldwater influence to carry 
them over the hot summer period. The trout congregate in 
well-ehaded tributaries, in spring holes, and pools at the 
7 Kendall Y.arner, Maine Department of Inland Fisheries a 
and Game, Preliminary Report, op.cit., p.5. 
o 
mouths of the tributaries during warm periods. Due to 
the concentration of the fish during low flows, the fishing 
is said to be liveliest during these periods, but access to 
fishing grounds by water routes is severely curtailed. 
July, August and September are the critical months for 
brook trout in the Upper St. John River. From a peak in 
April and May, averaging between 12,000 and 14,000 c.f.s., 
river flows drop to about 3,000 c.f.s. in late Llay, and this 
fairly high level is usually maintained through mid-June. 
During the next three months, however, water levels are 
often too low for canoeing, and river flows may diminish 
to a mere trickle. On the other hand, during seasons of 
abundant rainfall, or periods of storms, the river level re-
mains quite high. 
The extreme seasonal fluctuations of water levels in 
the Upper St. John, and the abrupt rise and fall of river 
levels in response to rainfall result from a combination 
of circumstances. In contrast to the Allagash, which is 
continuously fed even throughout the critical summer months 
by a system of large and small lakes, the Upper St. John 
has Inadequate natural storage capacity to maintain high 
water levels. Much of the Upper St. John drainage is flat 
swampland and high water tables, which is conducive to 
®U.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data for a Report on Fi3h and 
Wildlife Kcsources in iblation to tho Rankin rapids Dam 
and Rosorvoir. September, 1959* p.12. 
rapid run-off and heating. 9 It is alleged that deforest-
ation has further affected the run-off characteristics of 
the drainage by reducing the water retention and delayed 
run-off capacities of the soil* 
The other limitation on trout habitat suitability in 
the St. John is the scarcity of spawning and nursery areas 
above the Nine-IUle Bridge section, due to obstructions to 
fish migration which block many of the tributaries above 
this point. The Maine Department of Fish and Game has 
checked tributaries from the headwaters of the St. John 
downstream to St. Francis for obstructions to migration and 
extent of good trout spawning and nursery habitat. They 
found that, of nine tributaries checked between the North-
west Branch and the Nine-Kile Bridge, only two were then 
pass ble. Five were blocked by beaver dams, and boulder 
cascades made two others difficult to ascend at low water 
levels. Gravel "fane" formed at the mouth of the tribu-
taries were another frequently encountered barrier. From 
Nine-Mile down to the St. Francis River, forty tributaries 
were checked, and twenty-five were found to be passable to 
brook trout at low water. 1 0 
Despite these limitations, the Upper St. John provides 
seasonal brook habitat of sufficient quality to be con-
sidered one of the outstanding stream fisheries for brook 
trout in America. Even more renowned for brook trout fishing 
^Kendall V/arner, I.'aine Department of Inland Fisheries 
and Game, Preliminary Report, op. cit., p.6. 
10Ibid., p.7. 
than the mainstream are two of its tributaries, the Big 
Black River and the Little Black Rivor. The Big Black 
with wide, shallow bouldor riffles where trout feed, has 
excellent seasonal trout habitat, although water levels 
beoome very low in July and August. The Little Black re-
putedly has even better trout fishing, despite severe 
damage inflicted on the trout habitat by log drives in the 
1950*8. Pockwock and Chimenticook Streams also both pro-
vide exceptional seasonal habitat for trout. 
The reservoir that would be created by the construction 
of the Dickey-Lincoln dam would extend about fifty-seven 
miles upstream from the dam site on the main stem of the 
St. John to Seven Islands. The portion of the St. John 
River remaining in the wild state would be reduced by half. 
Twenty-five miles of the Little Black River would be inun-
dated and twenty-three miles of the Big Black. The Big 
Blaok and Little Black rivers would be flooded back into 
Canada, resulting in obliteration of these two superb trout 
fisheries in the United States. Also, several miles of 
Chlmentloook and Pockwock Streams would be flooded. 
The planned inundation would oause complete destruc-
tion of the existing river habitat for brook trout on the 
hmHw etem of the Upper St. John for 57 miles, the Little 
Black River, and most of the Big Blaok River. Brook trout 
.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., 
p. 15. 
are not well adapted to the lake environment such as exists 
in a reservoir pool* Thousands of acres of vast warm 
shallows would exist within the reservoir where competitive 
species better adapted to tho lake environment, such as 
yellow perch, already present in the St, Jolin, would gain 12 
a foothold and proliferate. In the deeper water typical 
lake species such as lake trout, whitofish and smelt might 
become dominant. Not only would the brook trout fishery in 
the project area be destroyed, but the trout fishery up-
stream from the reservoir would deteriorate as a result of 
the proliferation of yellow perch, a direct competitor with 
trout* The best spawning and nursery grounds for brook 
trout in the entire Upper St* John River are located within 
the project area, and would be engulfed and destroyed by 
the reservoir, further damaging the trout fishery upstream 
of the reservoir* 
Some compensation for the damage would be provided by 
the lake-type fishery of the reservoir pool, since species 
of fish adapted to a lake environment are not now signifi-
cant in the Upper St, John basin. The adjacent Allagash 
watershed, however, contains numerous lakes and ponds. 
The reservoir fishery could consist of a high-demand sport 
species such as lake trout, ^  but this cannot be predicted 
with certainty. The Fish and Wildlife Service report 
1 2 U.S.Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., p.21. 
Ibid., p.25. 
states: . • it is anticipated that the reservoir pool 
will provide fishery values which will only partially com-
14 
pensate losses." In any case, construction of Dickey-
Lincoln would result in a complete change from the present 
excellent natural river fishery for brook trout to a lake 
fishery of unpredictable, but certainly lower quality. 
^^U.S.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Servicet Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., p. 24. 
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PROJECT AREA 
Wildlife Resource 
The Upper St. John Rivor basin is covered by 
coniferous forests, but 100 years of logging activity has 
left virtually no virgin timber. The forest type that now 
predominates is the northern spruce-fir forest. Growth is 
characteristically thick, producing a dense canopy that ad-
mits little light to the forest floor. What open land does 
exist, consists of abandoned farms, cleared long ago to 
produce supplies for logging crews, and areas recently cut-
over by logging operations. 
The white-tail deer is the most important game species 
in the Upper St. John watershed, as in the rest of Maine. 
In general, however, the harsh climate of northern Maine 
and the heavily forested nature of the area, provide an en-
vironment far from ideal for the deer population. Good 
browse and cover are scarce in the interior forest, even 
during the milder seasons. The best deer habitat in this 
wilderness forest area is offered by the transitional vege-
tation, the young, brushy growth bordering open lands and 
the fringes of water courses. Small, well-managed timber 
outs provide good deer habitat, but large clear-cut areas, 
covered with deep slash, are of less value for deer. 
The olimate of northern Maine is characterized by long 
winters with snow cover lasting from October through April. 
This is the critical season for the deer populations of 
northern Maine. During the deep snow period, the deer 
gather in areas that provide both cover and ample food 
supply, known as deer yards. Almost all of the deer yards 
in the Upper St. John basin are looated along watercourses. 
Thirty-four yarding areas have been identified within the 
area that would be covered by the Dickey-Lincoln reservoir.^ 
The largest deer wintering areas were found to be in a ten-
mile stretch along the Little Black River, large areas on 
Chimenticook and Pockwock Brooks, and the lower ten-mile 
section of the Big Black River. Numerous smaller areas are 
located along the main stem of the St. John and on the minor 
tributaries.1^ The Fish and Wildlife Service reported in 
1959 that, "The deer yards located within the projeot area 
are of vital Importance in maintaining populations and 
17 attract deer from outside the project boundaries. 
Thirteen thousand acres of deer yards would be obliter-
1 A 
ated if the project were built. The deer population in 
the northern Maine forest is particularly vulnerable to 
destruction of its winter range. The Department of Inland 
Fisheries and Game, having extensively surveyed deer yards 
throughout the state, estimate that 38$, or one in three, 
of the deer yards in the interior forest have deer in excess 
of carrying capacity* In the sections of the state where 
"U.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data-Rankin Rapids, letter of 
transmittal, p.2. 
16Ibid., Figure 3, "Location and Extent of Existing 
Deer Wintering Areas". 
17Ibid., p. 27. 18Ibid.f letter of transmittal, p.9. 
the farm-woodland habitat is more predominant only one in 
ten deer yards was found to be over-browsed.^ 
Since the yards in the project area constitute the 
major deer wintering areas in the Valley, many deer from 
outside the project area proper are attracted to them. 
These deer would be forced to seek wintering areas outside 
the project area in yards which are already overcrowded, 
thus creating a secondary impact on the deer population 
wintering in yards outside the project area. Therefore, 
the Fish and Wildlife Services conclude, ". . . It is cer-
tain that a dramatic reduction in deer population will 
20 
take place within the area affected by the project." 
Moose are reported to be common in parts of the Upper 
St. John region, particularly in the project area. In the 
past, moose, once common throughout the Northeast, were 
found only in the northern Maine counties. That area 
served to replenish the moose herd throughout Maine, and it 
Is now said that the state's moose herd *. . .is the last 
sizable remnant of the species in the eastern United 
States." ^ The moose remains a protected species in 
Maine. Black bear are also abundant here and are subject 
to hunting usually for their trophy value. 
^State of Maine, Department of Inland Fisheries and 
Game, Deer in Maine. January 1961 (Revised 1964), p.82. 
20U. S.Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data-Rankin Rapids, op.cit., p.31. 
21Ibid., p.27. 
Pur-bearing animals are abundant in the Upper St. John 
Valley, although fur-trapping activity in the region ie 
much reduced from its past importance. Beaver ie the most 
abundant fur-bearing species and their dams are common on 
the tributaries in the project area. Flowages created by 
theee dams are generally of benefit to other species, al-
though not always to the brook trout. Mink, otter, and 
muskrat are also taken by trappers, and weasel, skunk, 
raccoon, rabbits, fisher, marten, and fox also inhabit the 
22 
Upper St. John Area. 
Waterfowl breeding habitat In the projeot area has been 
created largely by beaver flowages. The Little Black River 
is particularly noted for providing gpod waterfowl habitat. 
Black duck, blue-winged teal, wood duck, and ring-necked 
duok are the varieties most common to the project area. 
An informal waterfowl survey made in July 1972 by a party 
canoeing the river, reported sightings of ninety ducks of 
undetermined species over a period of seven days between 
Red Pine Grove ten miles upstream from Nine-Mile, and 
Ouellete Brook, along a fifty mile stretch of the Upper St. 
John. 2 4 
Bald eagles have been sighted in the Upper St. John 
area, but the Audubon society was unable to locate a neat 
22O.S.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. oit., 
pp. 28-29. 
23Ibid., p.29. 
24John Libby, July 18, 1972,, 
in the area during their recently completed census of 
eagles in Maine. Ugh Lake, located in the vicinity of 
Seven Islands, however, was found to offer good eagle 
nesting habitat.2-* 
Hunting pressure in the Upper St. John Valley, like 
fishing pressure, is dependent upon access, and the increase 
in hunting in recent years is largely attributable to the 
expanded network of logging roads within the wildlands. 
Weather conditions do limit access to a greater extent in 
the northern section of Maine than elsewhere in the state, 
and an early heavy snowfall can result in a sharp deoline 
in the area deer kill. The white-tail deer ie the most 
sought after game animal in the Upper St. John area, al-
though black bear trophy hunting attracts many sportsmen to 
the area. The deer harvest in the region is low in compar-
ison with the rest of the state, a result of the relatively 
light hunting pressure and the scarcity of Ideal deer hab-
itat. A sharp upward trend in the deer kill in the Dickey-
Lincoln project area during the 1950*s became stabilized in 
the I960 *s.27 As hunting pressure continues to Increase in 
southern Maine, however, the Upper St. John can be expected 
to receive a share of the spillover, particularly as access 
roads are improved. 
^statement by Richard Anderson, Executive Director, 
Maine Audubon Society, personal interview, Jan. 31, 1973. 
26U.S.Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data-Rankin Rapids, op.cit., p.25. 
^Fred Bilbert, Llaine Department of Inland Bisherles 
and Game, Deer Season 1970. September 1971; Deer Season jL971. July, 1972. 
All wildlife inhabiting the project area would be dis-
placed and lose 90,000 acres of habitat if the Dickey-
Lincoln project ie built. The Pieh and Wildlife Service 
Study concluded that, "The displaced wildlife population 
will be lost, since wildlife habitat in surrounding areas 
2S 
is being utilized to its maximum capacity-
At the maximum pool elevation planned by the Corpe of 
Engineers, 88,600 acres would be flooded. At the proposed 
mlnlnrnm pool elevation, 58,000 acres would be flooded. 
Development of edge-type habitat, beneficial to moet 
speoies of wildlife, would normally result from the growth 
of brushy cover along the cleared shoreline. The fluctua-
tion of the water level in the reservoir, in response to the 
dally peaking operation of the Dickey dam, however, would 
greatly reduce the benefits by Inhibiting the type of 
vegetation which would provide food and cover for wildlife. 
Approximately 1,000 acres would be flooded or uncovered for 
eaoh one-foot change in the water levels of the pool, with 
the result that 30,600 acres could be alternately exposed 
or inundated during the normal operation of the projeot. 
Although this area would not be removed completely ae wild-
life habitat, it would have minimal value as wildlife 
habitat, and no value as deer wintering habitat. 
Waterfowl breeding habitat in the projeot area would 
be completely lost. Some marshy areae would develop on 
Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data-Ramkin Rapids, op.cit., p.31. 
the fringes of the reservoir, but due to the fluctuations 
in the pool level that will occur, they would be complete-
ly unsuitable for nesting use. Additional resting area for 
waterfowl would be provided by the reservoir, but this type 
of habitat is already so abundant that any waterfowl bene-
fits from the pool will only be competing with the lakes 
and ponds of northern Maine whioh are more than adequate to 
meet the need. 2 9 
The Pish and Wildlife Service found in 1959 that "The 
wildlife species found within and adjacent to the projeot 
area are of considerable value even though not heavily util-
ised at the present time. Heretofore, this wilderness area 
acted as a reserve of wildlife which would be expected to 
take up increasing hunting pressures as more accessible 
areas beccme heavily hunted. The recent Increase in deer 
hunting indicates that tapping of this reserve has begun.^ 
The importance of this area for maintaining deer popula-
tions by supplying critical deer wintering habitat for the 
entire region has been pointed out already. It is particu-
larly significant, according to this study, that this wil-
derness area has functioned as a regenerative area for 
once-rare species such as the moose, the marten, and the 
fisher, when their populations became drastically reduced 
2%.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op.cit., p.31. 
30Ibid., p. 29. 
throughout the state, due to the advance of civilization 
or heavy hunting or trapping pressures. At one time the 
marten could he found in Maine only in the Upper St, John-
lower Allagash valleys, ^ 
The stated purpose of the 1959 report, "Substanti-
ating Data for a Report on Fish and Wildlife Resources in 
Relation to the Rankin Rapids Dam and Reservoir", was to 
evaluate the fish and wildlife resources of the lower 
Allagash River Basin and the Upper St. John River Basin, 
and to estimate the effect of the proposed Rankin Rapids 
project on those resources. The conclusions and policy 
recommendations of the Fish and Wildlife Service are con-
tained in a separate part of *;he report in the accompany-
ing letter of transmittal. The results of the investiga-
tion, as Interpreted by the Fish and Wildlife Service, 
showed that: "1) the proposed project would cause major 
losses to fish and wildlife resources, 2) that the effects 
of the project on fish and wildlife resources would extend 
far beyond the limits of the projeot area • . " and 
"3) that the proposed project would destroy existing and 
potential values of the Allagash River which cannot be re-
placed by any other site in the eastern United States," ^ 
The central reoommendation of the report is that • , 
mfty^ Tmnn overall benefits, including those based upon fish 
^U.S.Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op.cit., 
pp, 2d2and 30. 
^Ibid., letter of transmittal, p. 1, 
and wildlife resources, bo realized by utilizing the Big 
Rapids and Lincoln School dam sites." ^ Later investiga-
tion of the sites on the St. John located above the con-
fluence with the Allagash proved the Dickey-Lincoln site to 
be more satisfactory than the Big Rapids site. 
In essence, the Pish and Wildlife Service Study con-
cludes that the Allagash River is an irreplaceable natural 
resource, and that the Upper St. John River is expendable. 
The evidence supplied in the two reports, however, does not 
justify this distinction between the value of the Allagash 
and the value of the St. John. Only the brook trout fishery 
of the Allagash is said to be "of better quality and 
quantity" than that of the St. John, and even so, it is a 
fine distinction between which of the two "superior" trout 
streams is more so. The fact that the St. John offers more 
abundant deer wintering habitat tlian does the Allagash is 
not pointed out. Nearly every statement extolling the ir-
replaceable values of the region applies equally well to 
the St. John as to the better known Allagash. 
The recommendation that the Upper St. John should be 
flooded "to maximize overall benefits" has no basis in the 
evidence presented in the "Substantiating Data" report. 
Indeed, the tone of the letter of transmittal conveys the 
impression that the conclusions and recommendations were 
made independently of the factual information on fish and 
^U.S. Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, letter of 
transmi ttal, p.2. 
wildlife resources presented In the report. This report 
represents an attempt to declare arbitrarily that the en-
vironmental damage inflicted on the Upper St. John by a 
hydroelectric projcct would not be serious enough to reject 
euch a project. Yet, in 1955, no comprehensive evaluation 
of the Dickey-Lincoln project had been made, the final dam 
site had not been chosen, and thus, very little was known 
about the economic value of the project. It is clear that 
the 1959 report was used to justify and advocate the trade-
off that was being made, the St. John for the Allagash, by 
the Department of the Interior through its subagency the 
Fish and Wildlife Service. The construction of the hydro-
eledtrlc dam on the St, John is depicted as crucial for the 
protection of the Allagash} "The proposed plan to use a 
dam elte above the Allagash, i.e., Big Rapids or Dickey 
would also forever protect the recreational value of the 
Allagash River." This weak attempt to justify the project 
by equating its construction with the preservation of the 
Allagash, in spite of the overwhelming evidence of the 
project's adverse environmental impact on the St. John, is 
a far-fetched and insidious rationalization, at best. 
The attempt, in the 1959 report, to identify the 
Dickey-Lincoln project with the preservation of the 
Allagash, plus the pre-determined character of the con-
clusions to the report, prompts speculation concerning the 
true motivation of the Department of the Interior in ad-
vocating the change of the dam site from Rankin Rapids to 
a site upstream on the St. John. It is not unlikely that 
Interior anticipated strong opposition to a hydroelectric 
project involving the Allagash, and actually never expect-
ed to succeed in "selling" the Rankin Rapids project. But, 
by starting out asking for a lot, an Allagash-St. John 
project, the planners succeeded in getting, not just a 
little, hut the St. John River project. Such a strategy 
allowed a grand gesture of concession to be made to envi-
ronmental interests, at the same time allowing opposition 
to the project to run its course. This apparent con-
cession undoubtedly did de-fuse much of the opposition to 
the project, opposition that might have focused on preserv-
ing the St. John had not the Allagash also been threatened. 
These suspicions are further substantiated by the lack 
of consideration given environmental impact in reports made 
on the Dickey-Lincoln project in the 1960*8, These reports 
totally ignored the information presented in both the 1957 
Fish and Game report and the 1959 report by the Federal 
Fleh and Wildlife Service, The report of a two-year review 
of the Paesamaquoddy-Upper St. John joint projeot Issued by 
the Department of the Interior in 1963, ^  and a supple-
ment to this comprehensive report by the Department of the 
Interior and the Army Corps of Engineers including an in-
depth study of all aspecte of the Dickey-Lincoln proposal,^ 
.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John F. Kennedy, The Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project. 
July 1963. op. cit., p. 
^U.S.Army Engineer Division, New England Corps of En-
gineers, Supplement to July 19<->3 Heport: The International 
Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project April 1,1^64, op.cit. 
make absolutely no mention of fish and wildlife losses 
which would result from the construction of the Dickey-
Lincoln project. A section entitled "Pish and Wildlife" 
is included in the comprehensive Interior Corps of Engin-
eers report, but the environmental impact of the Dickey-
Lincoln project is not discussed at all. Instead, this 
section, consisting of two paragraphs, goes to absurd 
lengths to stress the environmental benefits of the 
Passamaquoddy project, dismissing completely the possi-
bility of any adverse environmental effects from the tidal 
projeot. It is significant that the well-documented ad-
verse environmental effeots of the Dickey-Lincoln project 
were not mentioned, nor wae it even indicated that any 
studies of the subject had ever been made. 
Wilderness Camping and Canoeing 
The primary attraction of the Upper St. John-Allagash 
region is the opportunity for long, unbroken canoe trips, 
enhanced by excellent brook trout fishing, entirely in a 
wilderness setting. It ie possible to canoe for 130 miles 
on the Upper St. John, from the headwaters in the remotest 
part of the north woods at Fifth St. John Fond, through 
the heart of the interior forest of Maine, before striking 
any settled areas. 
The traditional approach to the headwatere involves a 
long and arduous upstream trip from Moosehead Lake to the 
Weet Branch of the Penobscot River, from the West Branch 
to the North Branoh Penobscot and Bog Pond, where a canal 
leade to Fifth St. John Pond. Beaver dams and uncontrolled 
growth now impede the canal, but there is no automobile 
ficcees. A small stream runs from Fifth St. John Pond to 
Baker Lake, where a private International Paper Company 
road crosses the stream. This ie the highest point in the 
headwaters that may be reached by automobile. 
Probably the access route to the Upper St. John used 
most commonly by canoeists is the private road of the Inter-
national Paper Company known as the Realty Road. Since 
the Realty Road comes in from Daaquam, following the 
Oaaquam River and the Northwest Branch St. John, it affords 
easy access to those wishing to begin their trip in this 
section of the headwaters. The Realty Road orosses the St. 
John Just below the confluence of the Baker Branch with 
the Northwest Branch, a good starting point for the run 
down the main stem of the St. John. It is about eighty 
miles from the Realty Road Bridge to the settlement at 
Allagash by river, and the canoeist is warned that, after 
putting in there is H. • .no way to return to civiliza-
tion except to go downstream, and there are heavy rapids 
before reaching the Allagash." ^ 
The run from Daaquam to Allagash is no longer the dire 
test of survival that this statement implies. An exteneive 
network of private paper company roads has been developed 
on the west side of the river from the Nine-Mile Bridge 
area downstream. Today there remains only one good sized 
stretch on the main stem of the St* John River whioh is 
truly inaccessible by road. All the land in the Upper St. 
John Valley Is owned by the forest products Industry, how-
ever, and all roads are privately constructed, maintained, 
and controlled by the landowners. Permission Is required 
for their use by the publio. 
The two drawbacks to canoeing the St. John River, 
namely Indefinite water levels and voracious insects, make 
It ideal to run the river early in the season. In middle 
to late May high water is guaranteed but the flood stage 
hpa passed and the blaok fly hatch has not yet begun. 
Within the 2,725 sq. miles of the Upper St. John basin, 
only a few lakes or ponds of any else exist, thus, natural 
^Appalachian Mountain Club, The A.M.C. New Inland Canoeing Guide. Bos ton i The Appalachian Mountain Club. 
storage ie insufficient to maintain the river at high 
levels during the Bummer. During June, water levels in the 
river decline until, by tho beginning of July, little more 
than a trickle nay remain. High water lovels occur period-
ically throughout the summer, however, depending on the 
amount of rainfall in the basin. 
In July, 1972, I spent ten days on a canoe-fishing 
r 
trip on the Upper St. John with Sherwood and Lorraine Libby 
and their family. The water level was consistently high 
during our trip and we found the canoeing to be delightful. 
The canoe run consists of a swift current, smooth for the 
most part, but never tedious due to the frequently en-
countered sets of rocky rips. The stream bed gradient is 
gentle, falling at the rate of six feet per mile with only 
two really fast drops. Two sets of difficult rapids must 
be negotiated before reaching settled communities. The Big 
Black Rapids, just above the mouth of the Big Black River 37 
are rated Class III and, because heavy growth along the 
shore prohibits carrying these rapids, they must be either 
lined or run. Big Rapids is a more difficult, notably 
treacherous drop, two miles in length, but it can be carried 
via the logging road which parallels the river in the lower 
section. 
The major canoeing challenge of the trip was the ne-
gotiation of the Big Black Rapids, because these cannot be 
^Appalachian Mountain Club, Canoeing Guide, op. cit., 
p.389. 
easily carried. Lining these rapids is probably as danger-
ous as running them, since the river banks consist of ver-
tically folded peaks of bedrock and narrow ledjes running 
out into the channel. The approach to the rapids is 
marked by the steady dropping of the river bed into a 
gorge, affording some of the best scenezy on the mainstem 
run. 
We found that, while one is aware of being remote from 
organized towns and within paper company domain on the Upper 
Saint John, there are some unpleasant reminders of "civili-
sation" . Our Introduction to the river oame at Red Fine 
Grove campsite, slightly north of the Realty Road Crossing. 
This campsite is marred by its location beside a gravel pit 
and an airstrip, and is apparently used by the Forestry 
Service as a trash dumping area. Other campsites farther 
downetream, particularly those distant from road access, 
were overburdened with camper's debris. 
Logging activity is another Intrusion into the scenic 
beauty of the river, and the wilderness quality of the canoe 
ing experience. From the Big Black River, where, in 1972, 
the camper wae awakened by the grinding of chain eaws and 
the crashing of trees, down to Chlmenticook Stream, cutting 
operations are very muoh in evidence. On the north bank 
some recently cleared areas extend down to the river1 e edge. 
Although solitude is an essential Ingredient In the 
experience of wilderness camping, the Libby party dis-
covered that it is hard to find even in the "remote 
interior forest" • No formal oensus of the canoeing pres-
sure on the St. John has been taken, but our experience is 
probably indicative of the popularity of the Upper St. 
John for canoeing and flailing. Our first campsite, Red 
Pine Grove, was shared with a group of Massachusetts sports-
men who were well satisfied with their trout catch. At 
Nine-Mile Bridge, where the campsite is on the lawn of the 
Forestry Service Camp, we shared the campsite with a group 
of about thirty boys. Their leader, Gardiner DePoe, takes 
several groupe of young people with no previous canoeing 
experience down the St. John each summer, including an all-
girl group, teaching them everything from how to hold a 
paddle to the use of the setting pole. Another small party 
also arrived at Nine-Mile, having come in from Allagash. 
The next two stops were shared with Gardiner DeFoe et al at 
Seven Islands and Simmons Farm, although the open nature of 
the terrain allowed relative isolation. We encountered oc-
casional parties of fishermen along stretches of the river 
olose to access roads. 
Neither the visual pollution nor the lack of privacy, 
however, could detraot from the impresslveness of the St. 
John or from the delightful oanoeing. Towering spruce 
orowd down to the edge of the river bank, scarred and hewn 
as it is by the annual ice Jams. The river itself is very 
broad, dark, and forbidding, an aspect that is in part 
created by the ooloration of the water. Although the 
water remains clear and unaffected In taete, it ie a dark 
brown color that la attributed to tannic acid originating 
in the swampy headwater areas* 
Often heard descriptions of the "cathedral-like 
splendor" of the Maine woods oan be boat understood by 
canoeing a river such as the St. John. Dense walls of 
spruce and fir rise on either side of the river, making 
the canoeist very much aware of his Insignificance in this 
vastness of trees* The forbidding aspect of the foreet 
gives the traveller renewed appreciation of the gentle, 
pastoral serenity of the open areae, suoh as Seven Islands. 
The scenery is rarely dramatio except in the Big Black 
Bapide, but it ie consistently majestlo and is enlivened 
by the frequent sighting of wildlife—deer, moose, ducks, 
and even bald eagles, and the startling displays of wild-
flowers in the clearings. 
It is possible to canoe all the way to Grand Falls, 
Canada before taking out of the St. John, but it is 
recommended that the canoeist end the trip in the vicinity 
of Ft. Kent. Below Ft. Kent, the St. John runs through a 
series of Maine border towns which introduce not only 
visual pollution but serious sewage pollution and indus-
trial wastee from potato processing plants and pulp mills. 
The Canadian St. John oan be canoed, but it has two hydro-
electric projects located on it with substantial water im-
poundments at Mactaquao and Beechwood, eo that the free-
running nature of the river has been lost. 
The Upper St. John would bo flooded out as far as the 
upper end of the Seven Islands area by the construction of 
the Dickey-Lincoln dam. The project area encompasses the 
best canoeing, the best spawning areas for brook trout, and 
the major part of the only remaining unpolluted, free-
running, wilderness section of this 423-mile river. 
Flooding the Upper St. John, as proposed, would re-
place the current high value wilderness canoeing and fish-
ing experience with a very large lake environment. The 
recreational opportunities offered by tae reservoir pool 
would not begin to compensate for the loss of the wild 
river canoeing experience. The Dickey-Lincoln reservoir 
would be used primarily by boating enthusiasts or by those 
seeking access to hunting areas. The "Rankin Rapids Sub-
stantiating Data" report points out another factor that 
could have significant Impacts "Construction of the res-
ervoir would also afford easy aocess by boat to thousands 
of acres of previously almost inaccessible wilderness." 
Proponents of the project have argued that the Dickey-
Lincoln lake would provide a more popular reoreatlonal 
facility, one which could absorb greater use pressure than 
the more fragile wilderness environment. The same features 
which would be offered by the reservoir pool, however, are 
already provided in abundance by natural lakes and ponds 
in Maine, many in wilderness settings. Opportunities for 
Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., 
p.32. 
long wilderness canoe trips on rivers aref however, in 
far ehorter supply. ^ 
Certainly the scenic value of the Dickey-Lincoln lake 
would not compare with the river which it would replace. 
The debris generated by the 50,000 acres of timber that 
would be drowned by the reservoir would not enhance its 
eoenlc quality. Mudflats would surround the reservoir ex-
cept when at full pool. When the reservoir was lowered 
the full 40 ft. allowable, the recreationlsts seeking ac-
cess to the lake might walk across half a mile of these bad-
lands to reach the water. 
She recreational hunting potential of the arer sur-
rounding the reservoir would also be damaged by the elim-
ination of waterfowl habitat, the destruction of vital deer 
yarding areas, and, in general, by removing over 90,000 
acres of wildlife living space. At the same time that wild-
life habitat was being reduced, access to the area would be 
improved, and hunting pressure would increase accordingly. 
Several problems have been mentioned which detract 
from the quality of the Upper St. John for wilderness rec-
reation. The riverside logging activity, the crowded camp-
sites, and the overflowing trash barrels, however, can all 
be corrected. Additional oampsites for instance, would 
permit the degree of isolation the wilderness camper seeks. 
Restrictions on cutting close to the river would alleviate 
Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., 
P. 54* 
another source of blight* In other words, these conditions 
are symptoms, not of over-utilization, but of under-manage-
ment for the level of use the river now receives. The 
transmission facilities necessary to connect the powerhouse 
to load centers in Maine and Boston, a total distance of 400 
miles, would be a major source of scenic blight. It is es-
timated that the right-of-way slashes in which transmission 
lines and towers are located require over 100 acres per 
mile.*® Routing of transmission lines from the Dickey-
Lincoln site has not been finalized, but the lines and 
slashes would Inevitably extend the visual and environ-
mental impact of the project far beyond the dam site. 
The quarrying of 70 million cubic yards of earth and 
rook required for the dams and dikes in the violnlty of the 
project, as proposed by the Corps of Engineers, also holds 
tremendous potential for environmental and scenio degra-
dation. The main dam at Dickey alone would require 56 mil-
lion cubic yards of fill.*1 The Corps of Engineers* plans 
call for the quarrying of select granitic rock at Deboullie 
Mountain, 18 miles from the Dickey site. The Deboullie 
Mountain area system of lakes has been identified as one of 
four lake areas in Aroostook County with outstanding poten-
tial for recreational development, in an inventory made of 
*°Dean E. Abrahamson, "Environmental Cost of Eleotrlo 
Power", A Scientists' Institute for Public Information 
Workbook. 1^70, P« 
"""^ TJ.S.Army Engineer Division, New England Corps of 
Engineers, Supplement to July 1963 Report, op. cit., p.29. 
the lakes in Northern L!aine in 1969. The Lakes Study re-
ports that "few Liiine areas can match the scenic qualities 
of this location." 4 2 Twenty acres of Deboullio I-lountain 
are slated for quarry areas for the Dickey-Lincoln project. 
As access to northern Llaine and the interior forest 
improve, utilization of the area for all types of wilder-
ness-related recreation will increase. The Upper St. John 
ie already absorbing the overflow of recreationists from 
the Allagash wildernos3 Waterway. Tho Upper St. John has 
particular appeal for those seeking a less popular, rel-
atively undiscovered river trip. As the Allagash becomes 
more and more heavily utilized, it can be expected that 
use of the St. John, as the only comparable alternative, 
will continue to intensify. Conversely, if the St. John 
were flooded as proposed, one of the consequences would be 
increased utilization of the already crowded Allagash 
Waterway. 
The Massachusette and National Audubon Society have 
gone on record in opposition to the construction of Dickey-
Lincoln, contending that the present demand for wilderness-
type recreation will be slight compared to the demand in 
the near future. They have urged that the Upper St. John 
be declared a national wilderness waterway, since the con-
struction of the Dickey-Lincoln project would " . . . 
*2Edward C. Jordan Co., Ino., Northern Maine Regional 
Planning Commission* Lakes Study, Phase I Report. April, 
1969, p.18. 
destroy 90,000 acres of the moot usable wilderness remain-
ing in the Northeast." 
The Pish and Wildlife Scrvice declared in 1959, re-
ferring to the expanding demand for wilderness canoeing, 
hunting, and fishing, that "In the eastern United States, 
this northwestern section of Maine is the only remaining 
wilderness of its type, by present day ooncepts, which can 
supply this demand." ** 
^Statement for the National Audubon Society and Massachusetts Audubon Society, loc. cit. 
Department of the Interior, Pish and Wildlife 
Service, Substantiating Data - Rankin Rapids, op. cit., p.34. 
PART lll - Planning Studies of the Dickey - Lincoln Project1959-1 >65 
In 1956, the International Joint Commission (IJC) 1 
was requested by the United States and Canadian govern-
ments to study the feasibility of constructing a tidal 
power project at Passamaquoddy Bay. The IJC subsequently 
appointed a study committee which, in 1959, made its re-
port based on extensive study that took over three years 
and cost approximately S3 million. 2 It was determined 
that an auxiliary source of power would be necessary to 
"firm" the output of the Passamaquoddy project which would 
vary with the tidal cycle. The IJC considered several 
different auxiliary power sources, and selected a hydro-
electric dam on the Upper St. John at Rankin Rapids as the 
most favorable combination with Passamaquoddy. ^  
According to the plan proposed in the IJC report, the 
combined output of the two projects would produce contin-
uous baseload power for a Maine and New Brunswick market, 
with installed capacities of 300 megawatts at Passamaquoddy 
and 400 megawatts at Rankin Rapids. The cost of the pro-
ject was estimated to be $687.7 million (Interest 9 2 7/8;*) 
the tidal project accounted for $532 million of the total 
^The IJC was established in 1909» in accordance with 
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, to settle questions in-
volving the use of the waters of the St. John River basin. 
^U.S.Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, 
Subcommittee on Public Works, Public Works Appropriations 
for 1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st. Session, March l3» 
1967, p. 3o3. 
^U.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John F. Kennedy. July, 1963f op. cit.# p. 16. 
cost. In 1961 the IJC evaluated the 1959 report and de-
termined that while tho Passamaquoddy-Rankin Rapids Pro-
jeot would be possible from an engineering standpoint, it 
would not be economically feasible at that time. ^  
In May 1961, President Kennedy asked the Secretary of 
the Interior, Stewart Udall, to review the IJC Report to 
see what changes in fuel, engineering, and financial costs 
might make the joint project economically feasible. ^  A 
Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee was appointed 
and it reported in 1963 that the joint Passamaquoddy-Tidal-
Upper St. John River hydroelectric project was feasible 
from both an engineering and an economic standpoint, if a 
7 
number of basic changes were made in the IJC plans. 
The most significant change recommended was the devel-
opment of different marketing assumptions, based on a Pre-
liminary Load and Resources Study in the New Brunswick-New 
England areas, made in 1961 for the Study Committee. The 
Interior Plan proposed that the combined project produce 
primarily peaking power instead of baseload power, and 
serve an expanded market area necessary to utilize the peak-
ing power potential from the project. The Interior Plan 
visualized that the potential peaking power capacity of the 
two sites would be adequate to supply most of the growth in 
*U.S.Congress, House, Public Works Appropriations for 
1968, op. cit., p. 3^3. 
^U.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John P. Kennedy, July, 1963, op. cit., p. 1. 
6Ibid., p. 2. 7Ibid., p.8. 
peaking requirements for years ahead in New England and 
o 
New Brunswick. 
In accordanoe with the changed marketing plans, the 
proposed installed capacity at PassaiLaquoddy was increased 
to 1,000 megawatts and the proposed Dickey-Lincoln capac-
ity was lnox*eased to 750 megawatts (one megawatt equals 
Q 
1,000 kilowatts). J Another source of project revenues 
was introduced in the form of payment to the United States 
government for so-called downstream power benefits to 
Canadian plants on the lower St. John, that would accrue 
from Increased electrical production made possible by an 
increase in river storage on the Upper St. John. ^  The 
Bite of the Upper St. John hydroelectric project was 
changed from Rankin Rapids to Dickey-Lincoln School "in 
order to protect the Allagash". 
The "Benefit to Cost Ratio" for the joint project was 
calculated to be 1.27 based on benefits from power, rec-
reation and area redevelopment. 
No separate economic analysis was presented for the 
Dickey-Lincoln project, but this statement paved the way 
for the independent Dickey-Lincoln projects Although we 
propose that the Tidal Power Plant and the Upper St. John 
River Development be fully integrated, our economic 
analysis clearly indicates that either project is 
®U.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John P. Kennedy, July, 1963, op. cit., p. 75. 
%bid,, p. 6. 10Ibid., p. 6. ^Ibid., p. 41. 
financially feasible and could stand on its own feet as a 
separate project." 1 2 
Immediately following the publication of the July 1963 
report and recommendations, an "Army-Interior Advisory 
Board on the Passamaquoddy-Upper St. John River Project" 
was created to oversee the additional work needed to supple-
ment the July 1963 report. The supplement ^  contained two 
separate reports: an economic analysis of the joint pro-
ject by the Department of the Interior, and a Corps of En-
gineers report on geologic site investigations on the hydro-
logic conditions on the Upper St. John, and preliminary 
engineering layouts of the dams and generating facilities 
for the Dickey-Lincoln project. For the first time, the 
Dickey-Lincoln project was presented and analyzed as a 
separate facility capable of independent operation. 
The 1964 supplement determined the benefit-cost ratio1* 
for the combined project to be 1.47* ^ but the benefit-
cost ratio for Dickey-Lincoln alone was much more favorable, 
2«25, while the Quoddy benefit-cost ratio was marginal at 
1*04* The average annual cost of equivalent amounts of 
•Department of the Interior, Report to President 
John P. Kennedy, July, 1963, op. cit., p. 52. 
^Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee, for 
the U.S.Department of the Interior, Supplement to July 196j 
Report: The International Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Pro-
ject and Upper St. John River Hydroelectric Power Development, August, 1964, 
^Ratio of annual project benefits to annual costs, the basic tool used in the evaluation of the economic 
feasibility of Federal water resources projects. 
^Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee, Supplement, 1964, op. cit., p. 47* 
electricity was found to be lower if supplied by the pro-
posed Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln1^ source than by privately-
owned power sources,17 and even lower if supplied by an 
independent Dickey-Lincoln project. 
The 1964- Supplement also showed that the Federal gov-
ernment could produce equivalent electrical power at less 
cost than the coot of power from Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln, by 
building federally-financed steam plants, nuclear plants, 
or pumped storage. Those alternatives were rejected, how-
ever, as being . . incompatible with the fundamental 
purposes of this report.", because they would not pro-
vide the non-power benefits of recreation and area redevel-
opment that would be provided by the Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln 
proposal. Furthermore, alternate sources would " . . . 
fail to utilize a significant undepletable resource and 
eource of energy which is constantly being wasted . • . 
in the flows of the Upper St. Jchn River on its course to 
19 
the sea." 
The 1964 Supplement was circulated to Federal agen-
cies and the Kew England governors for their review and 
comment. The Interest rate for the Federal Treasury was 20 increased to 3 1/4i» in 1965. Also, the cost of 
.75 per kilowatt per year plus 3 mills per KWH 
17S27.50 per kilowatt per year plus 3 mills per KWH. 
Composite figure provided by the Federal Power Commission 
(FFC) 
^Passamaquoddy-St. John River Study Committee, 
Supplement to July 1363 Report: August 1964, op.cit.,p.7. 
19Ibid., p.8. 
20U.S .Department of the Interior, Report to President 
Lyndon B. Jolmson. July, 1965, op. cit., p.4. 
electric power from alternative priv&to sources hsd 
p i 
dropped substantially. These changes caused the bene-
fit-cost ratio for the Quoddy-Dickey-Lincoln project to 22 decline to 1.19. The benefit-cost ratio for Dickey-
Lincoln declined as well, but remained very favorable, at 
23 
1.81. J The separate Quoddy project's benefit-cost ratio 
declined, however, below unity, to 0.86.2^ In terms of 
at-market electricity for 1365, it was estimated that 
power from an independent Dickey-Lincoln project would cost 
$15.50 per kilowatt-year and 3 mills per KWH (kilowatt-
hour); equivalent power from a private utility, serving 
the same market, cost $23.50 per kilowatt-year plus 2.6 
mills per KWH; while power from the joint Quoddy-Dickey-
Lincoln project would cost £36.72 per Kilowatt-year and 
3 mills per KWH. 2 7 
In their reviews, the Department of Commerce, the 
Federal Power Commission, and the Treasury Department 
pointed out that the Quoddy tidal project was clearly un-
economical, but recognized the economic feasibility of the 
Dickey-Lincoln project. On the basis of the approval and 
concurrence of the agencies reviewing the Supplement in 
1965, the Department of the Interior made five recommend-
ations: 
.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Passamaquoddy Tidal Power Project 
and Upper St. John River Hydroelectric Development. July, 
1S65, p.5. 
§?Ibid., Federal Power Commission review, p.6. 23Ibid., p.6. 24Ibli> p - 5 - 25Ibid>f p # 6 
26Ibid., p.5. 27Ibid., p.6. 
1) Immediate authorization, funding and construction 
of Dickey-Lincoln and early completion ox neces-
sary arrangements with the Canadian government. 
2) Authorization of continued study, re-examination and possible redesign of the Passamaquoddy pro-ject. 
3) Preservation of the Allagash river. 
4) Improvements to Roosevelt International Park on Campobello Island. 
5) Continuation and intensification of a comprehen-
sive program for th$ .multiple-use of the area's 
natural resources. 
The Dickey-Lincoln proposal was the only recommenda-
tion that had any substance. The others were padding de-
signed to bolster the Importance of the Dickey-Lincoln 
project as the 'key' to a regional resource development 
program. The Dickey-Lincoln proposal recommended for auth-
orization was the 1964 Corps of Engineers* plant at the 
Dickey dam, a generating capacity of 760 megawatts, oper-
ating for brief periods each day would generate 750 million 
KWH of peaking power annually. At the Lincoln School dam 
an Installed capacity of 34 megawatts would be operated 
2o to produce 260 million KWH annually of baseload energy. * 
.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
Iyndon B. Johnson, July, 1965» op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
^^Passanacuoddy-St. John River Study Committee, 
Supplement to July 1963 Report, August, 1964, op. cit., 
pp. 23-24. 
PART IV - Congressional Action on Dickey-Lincoln 
1965-1972 
Acting on the recommendation of the Department of the 
Interior, President Johnson, on July 11, 1^65, asked Con-
gress for the immediate authorization of the Dickey-
Lincoln Project at a cost of $227 million. On the motion 
of Senator Muskie, a member oi' t^.u Senate Appropriations 
Committee, a provision authorizing the Dickey-Lincoln pro-
ject was Included in the omnibus Public Works Bill. Unlike 
Other projects in the $1.9 billion bill, the Dickey-Lincoln 
provision was included without hearings. ^  
On July 27, the omnibus Public Works Bill passed the 
2 
Senate, including the Dickey-Lincoln measure* Reportedly, 
no reference was made to the Maine Project in the Senate de-
bate on the Public Works Bill, and the Maine senators did 
not participate in the floor deliberations. ^  
The House of Representatives did, however, assign its 
Public Works Subcommittee to review the Senate measure and 
hear- testimony. Arguments in favor of Dickey-Lincoln were 
heard from the Governors of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont, 
Maine Congressmen Hathaway and Tupper, Interior Secretary 
Udall, and spokesmen for the Maine and National Rural Elec-
tric Associations. Supporters of the project testified that 
the Dickey-Lincoln project would provide a source of inex-
pensive electric power for E2aine and New England and bring 
Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1 W . 
op. cit., p.3o5» 
2Ibid. 
^Bangor Daily News, July 28, 1965. 
economic benefits to a depressed area as well. * 
Opposition to the authorization of the project in the 
Subcommittee hearings came from two sources: the New 
England private electric utilities, and the supporters 
of the proposed Maine Power Authority. No testimony op-
posing the project on environmental grounds was given in 
1965. 
The chairman of tne Electric Coordinating Council of 
New England (ECC), Albert Cree, spoke for the nineteen 
major electric utilities, all private, of New England. Mr. 
Cree claimed that electric power equivalent to the amount 
produced by Dickey-Lincoln could be produced 
. .. by a combination nuclear-pumped 
storage plant for 71 million dollars, capital cost, based 
on the costs of the two power plants then under construc-
tlon in southern New England. J The president of Central 
Maine Power, Y.illiam Dunham, represented the seven major 
Maine private electric utilities. Mr. Dunham stated the 
inveetor-owned utilities would meet the needs of the state 
for baaeload and peaking power, and do it at lower cost 
than Dickey-Lincoln, including taxee, from which Federal 
projects are exempt. He predicted that, between 1965 and 1980, barring further inflation, private utilities would 
decrease Maine electric rates by 30$. This would be 
accomplished by the economies of scale that would be 
^Portland Press Herald, August 10, 1965. 
5 Ibid. 
realized by expansion of the transmission grid, the 
strengthening of the Maine systems interconnection with 
the New England energy pool, r_nd the construction of on 
atonic plant in Maine in tne 1970*s.6 
To reinforce their claims, CUP announced a rate cut 
for domestic consumers, the second in two years, shortly 
before tho final vote on the 1965 Public Works Bill. 
The Citizens Committee for a Maine Power Authority 
also appeared in opposition to Dickey-Lincoln. They con-
tended that their proposal to create a state power author-
ity to finance the construction of a hydroelectric project 
at Big Rapids on the Upper St. John River, could produce 
and deliver power at lower costs than either the Federal 
7 
proposal or a private utility alternative. 
The majority of the House Public works Committee 
recommended the authorization of Dickey-Lincoln. A motion 
to strike the project from the omnibus bill was rejected by 
a tie vote in the House. In October the House passed the 
Senate version of the 1965 Public works Bill as recommend-
ed by a House-Senate Conference committee, by a vote of 
207-185. Twenty out of twenty-five Hew England Congress-
men voted against the omnibus Bill, primarily because of 
their opposition to the Dickey-Lincoln authorization 
measure.8 
^Bangor Daily Kows, August 17, 1965. 
"^ Portland Press Herald, August 11, 1965* 
®Bangor Daily Hews, August 17, 1965. 
To fund pro-cons true ticn planning of the Dickey-
Lincoln project, $724,000 was appropriated for 1966, and 
31,100,000 for 1967- 9 A special study by the staff of the 
House Public Works Subcommittee was ordered in September, 
1966 to . . determine the economic feasibility and sound-
ness of the proposed Federal investment of 3218,700,000." 1 0 
in the Dickey-Lincoln project. The Staff Report as entered 
into the record of the March 1967 Subcommittee hearings on 
the Public Works appropriations for 1968. 
Congress subsequently denied the appropriation of 
$1,676,000 to complete preconstructlon planning, and has 
refused every year since 1967 to grant more funds for the 
Dickey-Lincoln Project, although well over $2 million had 
been spent in actual planning when funds were cut off. 
In order to circumvent the persistent opposition of 
the private utilities to the Dickey—Lincoln project, in 
1971, Representative William Hathaway proposed a compro-
mise plan. According to the Hathaway Plan, the generating 
capacity at the dams would be reduced to 100 megawatts, 
and would produce baseload power for a Maine market. The 
transmission of peaking power to southern New England 
would be dropped, and the project purposes would be extend-
ed to include irrigation for Arroostook County potato farms. 
In 1971, Congress authorized a study of the Hathaway 
%angor Daily News, August 17, 1965. 
•Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968 
op. cit., p. 382. 
Plan, but failed to appropriate the $100,000 requested to 
finance a feasibility study. Soon after, the Senate ap-
proved $800,000 for the original project, but later gave in 
to House pressures and completely dropped the Dickey-Lincoln 
Project from the 1972 Publio Works. 1 1 The following year, 
basically the same pattern was repeated. 
In 1973, the House approved 350,000 to fund a study of 
the compromise Hathaway Plan for Dickey-Lincoln. After con-
sidering an $800,000 appropriation to revive the full-scale 
project, the Senate concurred with the House action. 
If the results of a study, by the Amy Corps of En-
gineers, of the economic, engineering and environmental 
feasibility of the compromise Dickey-Lincoln project are 
favorable, the compromise project stands a better chance of 
receiving funding than does the full-scale project. Sup-
port for the full-scale project has waned within the Maine 
congressional delegation. Senators Hathaway and Muskie re-
main committed to the original Dickey-Lincoln plan, but 
prospects for funding are very dim, given the persistent 
and powerful opposition of the private electric utilities 
Of New England. Since opposition by the private electric 
Industry has been the major obstacle for Dickey-Lincoln, 
the revised marketing plan of the compromise Dickey-
Lincoln should quell resistance from that quarter. Pre-
sumably only Maine's eleotric industry will continue to 
oppose the smaller projeot. 
11Itelne Times. September 24, 1971. 
PART V - Examination of the Economic Justification Put 
Forth for Dickey-Lincoln 
In the years Immediately following the authorization 
of Dickey-Lincoln by Congress in 1965, two significant 
studies were made of the economic aspects of the project: 
one by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston, and one by the staff of the Subcommittee on 
Publio Works, House of Representatives. 
Subcommittee on Public Works Staff Study 
In September, 1966, the House Committee on Appropri-
ations asked that a special Staff study be made of the 
economic feasibility and soundness of the proposed Federal 
investment of $218,700,000 in thB Dickey-Lincoln project. 1 
The Public Works Subcommittee Staff was asked to in-
clude the following in their research: 
1) a review and appraisal of the completeness and 
adequacy of the study conducted by the Corps of 
Engineers and the Department of the Interior on 
which the report was based recommending the pro-
jeot for authorization. 
2) An analysis of the soundness of the estimated 
allocation of the annual project benefits to 
power, flood control, and area redevelopment. 
3) An analysis of the soundness of the cost estimate 
of $218,700,000. 
4) An appraisal of the plans for the marketing of 
power, including the proposed power rates to be 
charged and the payout schedule. 
5) A comparison of the estimated cost of power pro-
duction under the project with costs under alter-
native means, including steam plants, nuclear 
^U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 382. 
5)(continued) 
plants, and pumped storage and nuolear combin-ations. 
6) An overall appraisal of the need ar<d significance 
of the project in ::.eotinpower requirements in 
the light of the expansion program planned by the 
New England utilities." 2 
In the course of its investigations, the Subcommittee 
Staff consulted a variety of informed sources and sought 
to obtain the views of those opposed to the project, as 
well as those who had planned and promoted it. Members of 
the Staff discussed the projeot with officials of the 
Federal Power Commission, the Department of the Interior, 
and the Army Corps of Engineers. The Departments of Com-
merce, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget were also con-
sulted on their views. Meetings were held with officials 
of New England's private electric industry and with munic-
ipal electric utilities and rural electric cooperatives. 
The opinions of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Maine 
state officials, and engineering and constructions firms 
were also solicited. ^  
The Staff report on Dickey-Lincoln was entered in the 
record of the Subcommittee hearings on the Public Works 
Appropriations for 1968. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study 
In 1966, the "New England Business Review", a publi-
cation of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, produced a 
study of "the quest for low-cost eleotrlcity" in New 
Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 382. 
3Ibid. 
England. One issue examined the past, current, and pro-
spective developments within the private utility industry 
of New England; the next examined four public power developments, including Dickey-Lincoln, then being proposed for 
New England. 
The principal finding concerning the private utili-
ties was that rapid technological advances in electrical 
production and operational coordination would substantial-
ly reduce power costs by 1972 "barring further inflation".^ 
The "Business Review" predicted that through the efficien-
cy of an interconnecting extra-high-voltage transmission 
network, combining production from all major New England 
generating sources on a one-system basis, the cost of 
electricity to consumers should decline by as much as 251* 
from 1966 price levels. ® 
In judging the merit of a public power proposal, the 
"Business Review" suggested the following factors should 
be given consideration, in addition to the dollar costs 
"Would the proposals foster worthwhile inter system coordination and assure high standards of service? 
Would they fill a distinct need in some parts of 
the market? 
What ere the ultimate effects on taxpayers? 
*John M. Wilkinson, "New England*e Power Develop-
ments: Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", New England 
Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research 
Department, Apri1, 1966, p.2. 
5Ibid. 
^John M. Wilkinson, "New England Power Developments: 
Part I . . .The private Utility Industry", New England 
Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Research 
Department, February, 1966, p.17. 
Is economic efficiency the sole criterion in judg-
ing a development, or are there over-riding social 
purposes of greater weight^ 
Will utility commission regulation of a natural 
monopoly assure the lowest possible power rates, or is regulation by competition also necessary?" 7 
Within this framework, four public power proposals 
were considered] the Dickey-Lincoln Federal hydro-
electric project, Canadian hydroelectric import through 
Vermont, mine-mouth thermal power from Appalachia, and a 
nuclear power plant in Maine built by a State Power 
Authority* While less concerned with the validity of the 
economic analysis of Dickey-Lincoln than the Staff report, 
the "Business Review" set forth a number of factors im-
portant for evaluating the contribution of these proposed 
public power developments to the problem of reducing 
power rates in New England. 
7John M. Wilkinson, "New England•s Power Develop-
ments s Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", New England 
Business Review, op. cit., p.2. 
Federal Evaluation Standarda 
Federally-financed water resources projects are eval-
uated according to a set of standards embodied in Senate 
Document #97. In the procedures outlined in S.D. #97, it 
is required that three tests be applied before Federal in-
vestment in a project can be considered a worthwhile allo-
cation of public funds. First, the "comparability test11 
requires that the project be the least costly means of 
providing power, the cost of equivalent power produced by 
alternative means being compared on the same terms, that 
is, at the same Interest rate and with the same tax exemp-
tions* Second, the "benefit-cost" test asks if the bene-
fits from the project exceed its costs. For this purpose, 
benefits are defined as the prices consumers would pay for 
equivalent services if the projeot were not built, and 
costs as the investment required to construct, operate 
and maintain the project. Third, although the project may 
not pass the first two tests, fulfillment of important 
socio-economic objectives, such as regional growth and re-
lief of unemployment and poverty, may justify a projeot 
Q 
not justifiable on purely economic grounds. 
She comparability test essentially oompares the oost 
of a publio projeot with the oost of private alternatives 
in terms of goods and servioes, assuming the same type of 
financing for each. If the alternatives prove less cost-
ly by this test, theoretically our "national resources 
®V711kinson, "New England^ Power Developmental Part II . . .Publio Power Proposals", op. oit., p.11. 
t>5 
stock" would be more efficiently used by providing the ser -
vice by the alternate means. The benefit-cost test i8 a 
comparison of the cost of the project services when pro-
Tided by the project and by alternatives with all the mar-
ket place money costs figured in. Thus, the higher interest 
rates and taxes paid on privately-financed projects are 
claimed as project benefits, since the consumer would have 
to pay these oosta to obtain the equivalent service by alter-
native means. If more than a single service ie provided by 
the project, such as flood control provided by a hydroelec-
tric dam, the alternative costs of providing that servioe, 
by building a flood control structure, are also claimed as 
project benefits. ^  
The benefit-cost measure ie by far the most important 
and widely used tool for water resource project evaluation. 
The comparability ratio is rarely even calculated. If a 
project passes the tomparability test, it automatically 
passes the benefit-cost test as well. The benefit-cost 
ratio may be favorable, however, even though the compar-
ability teet is not. That is, a private alternative which 
oosts less than the publio project when both are assumed 
to be tax exempt and financed at the same Interest rate, 
may oost more than the public project when taxes and the 
higher interest rate which private utilities must pay are 
taken into acoount. By strict definition, such a project 
is not eoonomloally feasible. Even if a projeot does not 
mast the above criteria, it nevertheless may be justifiable 
^Wilkinson, "New England*s power Developmentst 
Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", op. cit., p.11. 
on the grounds that it is the most efficient means of stim-
ulating the economy of an area, or of alleviating poverty 
and unemployment. 
Project Coat Analysis 
In order to comply with the House Public V.'orks Sub-
committee Staff'b request for an up-to-date benefit-coat 
ratio, in Octobor 1966, tho Array Corps of Engineers pre-
pared a new project cost analysis for Dickey-Lincoln. 
When the Staff study was conducted, and the 1966 cost es-
timates were current, the flew England Division of the 
Corps had begun the preliminary stages of advanced engi-
neering and design for Dickey-Lincoln. Approximately two 
more years of advanced planning would be required as part 
of a total of four years of pre construct! on planning. The 
oost of Dickey-Lincoln increased only $2 million between 
1964 and 1966, but certain unit costs changed substan-
tially* Although estimates for construction costs might 
be expected to fluctuate less widely as the more detailed 
phases of planning proceeded, the Staff study added a 
cautionary notei "Although the Corps cost estimate of 
$229,300,000 to construct the Dickey-Lincoln project is 
the best available at this preliminary stage of engineer-
ing and design, the final configuration of this project 
has not been determined and future engineering and design 
refinements will have an effect on costs until the stage 
of final contract letting." 1 0 
In order to carry out the requested evaluation of the 
reasonableness of the Corps construction cost estimates, 
the Staff consulted a variety of sources! the Tennessee 
.Confess, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op* cit., p. 3^8. 
Valley Authority, a pftHvate engineering firm, and the New 
England Electric Coordinating Council (ECC). These con-
eultations confirmed the fact that final costs can only he 
ascertained when detailed plans are available. A large 
number of variables are involved in estimating construc-
tion oosts, such as climatic conditions, the length of the 
work year, the type of equipment used, the effioiency of 
the contractor, the availability of good fill materials, 
the amount, type, and cost of labor, the cost of construc-
tion materials, and the unpredictable escalation of costs. 
Different cost estimates were arrived at by different es-
timators because of the difficulty of precisely deter-
mining the effects on costs of these factors. The Staff 
recognized that basically the cost estimates depend on the 
assumptions made by the estimators, and that judgment 
factors are influential since the estimation of costs is 
imprecise. 1 1 
On the basis of a so-called "limited review" of the 
Corps construction cost estimates for Dickey-Lincoln, the 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) agreed the major items of 
cost were accounted for in the Corps calculations, and 
that the construction cost estimates seemed reasonable for 
1966. 1 2 
A firm of consulting engineers, the Charles T. Main 
Co., of Boston, retained by the ECC to review the Corps 
construction cost estimates of August 1964, olalmed that 
^^TJ.S.Congress, Public WorkB Appropriations for 1968. op. cit., p. 390. ' ^ — r * 
12Ibid, p. 390. 
Dlokey-Llnooln Project: Estimate of Coat3 
as of October, 1966 
(In thousands of dollars) 
Dickey 
Project 
Lincoln School 
Projoct 
Total 
5,214 400 5,614 
1.738 1,238 2,976 
11,050 150 11,200 
67,114 6,490 73,604 
, 11,414 - 11,414 
. 52,385 5,307 57,692 
, 19,470 476 19,846 
560 50 610 
Buildings, grounds, 728 208 936 
•153*673 14,319 167,992 
21,361 1,961 22,322 
Engineering, design, 
eupervlslon, administration 19,079 1,720 20,799 
194,113 18,000 212,113 
Interest during construction 16,100 1,100 17,200 
210,231 19,100 229,313 
TOTAL DICKEY-LINCOLN COST* ~ $229,313,000 
• Not including transmission costs. 
Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriation, 
Subcommittee on Publio Works, Public Works Appropriations 
for 1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st Session, Llarch,1967, 
p. 387. 
Benefits and Costs of Dickey-Lincoln Compared 
Sources U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropri-
ations, Subcommittee on Public Works, Public Works'Appro-
priations for 1968, Hearings, 90th Congress, 1st. Session, 
March 13, 1967, p. 303. 
Project Costs 
Dickey-Lincoln construction coot $229,313,000 
(including interest at 3 l/8;» during 
construction) 
Transmission system cost 82.515.000 
(including interest at 3 1/8^ during 
construction) 
Total construction cost $311.828.000 
Total at-market annual project cost using 
100-year period of analysis and 3 l/8£ 
interest rate: 
Annual interest and amortization cost $10,215,000 
$311,828,000 x 0.3276 (3 for 
100 years) 
Annual operation and maintenance costs: 
Dickey-Lincoln 1,095,200 
Transmission system 862.000 
Total annual at-market project cost JiSiiZ^iiSS 
Project Benefits 
Annual flood control benefit $40,000 
Annual area redevelopment benefit 467,000 
Annual power benefit, including 18.798.000 
downstream energy benefit 
Total annual project benefits $19.305.000 
Ratio of annual project benefits to annual project costs: 
$19,305,000 „ , 5g $12,172,000 
the Corps had underestimated the cost of the Dickey dam 
alone by $70 million. Main alleged that the oost of fill 
was understated by $34 million, and that the climatic con-
ditions of Northern Maine would shorten the working season 
to 4 1/2 months, substantially increasing construction 
costs. The Corps demonstrated, however, to the apparent 
satisfaction of the Subcommittee, that their fill prices 
were realistic, although conservative, and that climatic 
conditions had been taken into account. 
The Corpe 1966 oost estimate of $229,300,000 for 
Diokey-Lincoln ie based on construction costs for that 
year, in compliance with S.D. #97, not on projected costs 
for the initial year of construction. The T7A advised 
that the total Corps oost estimate, minus the interest, 
should be escalated at about per year, with the likeli-
hood of higher rates of escalation after 1966. The 4?t per 
year figure was an average of the rates at which the oosts 
of land, labor, construction equipment, and installed 
equipment were increasing. Since about six and one half 
years would be required for the construction of the Dickey-
Lincoln project, according to the Corps, 4# cost increases 
eaoh year would amount to about $55 million, or a final 
projeot construction cost of $267 million, without interest. 
Assuming escalation at 5.^ , the final cost would be $280 
14 million without intereet. 
^^.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 397. 
14Ibid., p. 394. 
An increase in the Federal interest rate would cause 
a corresponding Increase in the final project costs. That 
rate ie estimated annually, by a formula set up by Con-
gress for multi-use water resources projects, related to 
the return on U. S. Treasury Bonds with terma to maturity 
of fifteen years or longer. The Corps calculation of in-
terest during construction of Dickey-Lincoln used the 1966 
rate of 3 l/8# per year, or $17,200,000 for the entire pro-
jeot* The Staff noted that an increase in the interest 
rate to 4 5/85* would result in a total interest for the 
project of $25,400,000 and an interest rate of 5 1/27& (the 
Treasury estimate of the true cost of borrowing money in 
December 1966) would produce a total interest cost of 
130,270,000. 15 
Federally-financed water resource projects are exempt 
from local, state and Federal taxes, eo increasing levels 
of taxation would affect the Dickey-Lincoln projeot costs 
only insofar as they contribute to increasing the costs of 
land, labor, and equipment. It might be said that this Is 
the only faotor that can be counted on to remain stable 
when making estimates of future project oosts. 
•Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968> 
op. cit., p.394. 
Analysis of Project Benefits 
In the economic analysis of the Dickey-Lincoln project upon which Congressional authorization was based, 
benefits attributed to Dickey-Lincoln were derived from 
three sources flood control, area redevelopment, and 
power. The so-called "non-power" benefits assigned to the 
project are minor, $510,000, compared to benefits from 
power of $18,800,000 annually. At various times since 
the project was authorized, other non-power benefits have 
been added from recreation, and it has been proposed that 
Irrigation benefits also be added. 
Non-power Benefits 
The annual flood control benefit to be derived from 
Dickey-Lincoln, $40,000, is a measure of the cost of two 
flood control dikes, averaged over 100 years. At 1963 
prices, the two dikes that would be required were esti-
mated to cost approximately $1,060,000. Between 1933 and 
1963 Fort Kent has suffered seven "consequential" floods, 
17 with damages averaging $47,800 per year. ' In May 1973, 
floods on the St. John River caused damages estimated at 
18 
$2,500,000 in Fort Kent alone. 
Annual area redevelopment benefite of $467,000 credit-
ed to Dickey-Lincoln represent the "wages paid during con-
struction to pereons employed from the pool of unemployed 
.Congrass, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 409. 
17Ibid.# p. 406. 
^Portland Press Herald. May 4, 1973. 
and underemployed workers residing within a reasonable dis-
tance of the project. and wages paid operation and 
maintenance personnel for 15 years after the project be-
gins operation, averaged over a 100-year period. 
A total of 11,200 man-yeare of labor would be re-
quired to build the Dickey-Lincoln project, according to 
the Corps of Engineers. The Corps determined that a maxi-
mum of 550 unemployed and underemployed workers could be ob-
tained from the Fort Kent area. The local labor pool would 
supply 840 man-years of semiskilled and 3,110 man-years of 
common labor, and 35 from the local labor pool would be em-
Ort 
ployed in operation and maintenance jobs. 
All of the 2,700 man-years of skilled labor required 
for the construction of Dickey-Lincoln would have to be im-
ported. Over the nine yeare required to construot the pro-
jeot, the Fort Kent area would supply the total requirement 
for semi-skilled and common labor for the first three years 
and the last year. For the four middle years, a large part 
of the semiskilled and oommon labor force would also have 
to be Imported. Imported labor, In all categories of skill, 
would be required to perform 1,100 man-years the fourth 
year of construction, 1300 the fifth, 1800 the sixth and 
seventh, 900 the eighth, and none during the last year. 
Presumably, some portion of this labor would be imported 
from Canada. ^ 
•Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968, 
op. cit., p. 407. 
^Ibid., p. 407 21Ibid. 
The long-term area redevelopment benefits from employ-
ment on the dam construction are debatable, since having a 
large temporary labor force in the area, for a few years, 
with many left unemployed in the wake of construction, 
could have an adverse effect on the local economy, A 
"peak" in the number employed would be reached in the 
eighth year of construction, according to the Corps plan* 
followed by a sharp decline. The Department of Commerce,, 
in its comments on the August 1964 Corps and Interior re -
port, advised some gradual phasing out of construction in 
order to achieve the projected area redevelopment bene-
22 
fits. It has been predicted that the project would 
have only a temporary positive impact on the area's economy, 
producing a "boom" as services and trades are overextended 
to satisfy the demands of the Influx of temporary labor, 23 
and a "bust" when construction was completed. J 
A study of the social and economic consequences of the 
Dickey-Lincoln Project was made for the Department of Agri-
cultural and Resource Economics, Maine Agricultural Exper-
iment Station in 1966 • The purpose of the study was "to 
present a still picture of the selected areas as of the 
summer of 1966," 2* and to collect data which would provide 
a base for subsequent analysis. The focus of this 
•Department of the Interior, Report to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson. July, 1965, op. cit., U.S.Department of 
Commerce Review, op. cit., p. 7. 
2%.S. Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968, 
op. olt., p. 408. 
2*Louis A. Ploch and Nelson L. LeRay, Social and 
Economic Consequences of the Dickey-Lincoln school Hydro-
electric Power Development on the Upper St. John Valley 
Malne—Phase I •"Preconstruction, March, 1968, Preface. 
preliminary phase of the research program was defined i 
"What happens to a relatively culturally and physically 
isolated rural, resource-oriented area, and to its people, 
when it becomes the site of a publicly financed project 
which temporarily Increases the population by many hun-
dreds of persons?M 25 Of the five towns surveyed, 43t* of 
the households had incomes under S3 % 000 a year. The sur-
vey found that, except for the people of Allagash, where 
most of the population would have to be relocated, the 
residents of the Upper St. John Valley were generally look-
ing forward to the construction of Dickey-Lincoln as a 
means of reversing the trends of poverty, unemployment and 
pC 
outmigration. 
There is certainly no doubt that flood oontrol bene-
fits would accrue from the conetruotlon of a dam above Ft. 
Kent. No claim is made that area redevelopment benefits 
would result from the attraction of industry to the area 
or from increased tourism if Dickey-Lincoln were built. 
The alleged area redevelopment benefits may or may not be 
valid, but consideration of non-power benefite serves two 
purposesi one, to pad the benefit side of the benefit-
oost ratio, thus offsetting costs} and two, to designate 
a portion of the projeot costs as nonreimbursable In the 
project repayment analysis, thereby lowering the rates 
that must be charged for electricity to repay the 
2^Louis A. Plooh and Nelson L. LeRay, Social and 
Economio Consequences.—Phase I. Preconstruction. Llarch, 
1968, op. cit., p. 1. 
26Ibid.f p. 38. 
the investment cost of the project. In general, non-
power benefits serve to enhance the project's apparent 
value, without adding anything to the ooet of the projeot. 
Power Benefits 
The $18,798,000 in annual power benefits from Dickey-
Lincoln constitutes 96<f> of the total benefits. Diokey-
Lincoln power benefits were calculated in accordance with 
S.D. #97, which states in part: "The value of power to the 
users is measured by the amount that they should be willing 
to pay for such power. The usual practice is to measure 
the benefit in terms of the cost of achieving the same re-
sult by the most likely alternative means that would exist 
27 
in the absence of the project." ' The Federal Power Com-
mission interprets "the most likely alternative means" as 
the least costly alternative. S.D. #97 also specifies that 
when computing costs of alternative sources of power to be 
constructed with private financing, which alternatives to 
Dickey-Lincoln would be, the costs must include the inter-
est, taxes, insurance and other cost elements actually in-28 
curred by such privately-owned projects. 
The Subcommittee Staff asked the Federal Power Commis-
sion to study the estimated cost of power from alternative 
sources (so-called "power values") ae compared with the 
cost of power that would be produced by Dickey-Lincoln. 
^U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. oit.f p.409, citing Senate Document 97, Section V-_t)-5. 
.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968, 
op. cit.• p.398. 
The Department of the Interior's proposed plan for market-
ing Dickey-Lincoln power waa considered in making this com-
parison, since marketing assumptions about the future type 
(peak or baseload), quantity and location of demand affect 
the cost of producing and transmitting power. Therefore, a 
valid alternative must meet the needs of the same type of 
market. The Department of the Interior, which would market 
Dickey-Lincoln power, proposed to sell 100 megawatts of 
baseload power at 50^ system load factor in Maine, and the 
remaining 600 megawatts of power in the Boston area as peak-
ing power, at 10^ load factor. 
Unit costs for the two types of power were derived and 
converted to at-market cost of power delivered to Bangor, 
Portland and Boston, using both privately and P^derally 
financed sources of power. The at-market charges for Dickey-
Lincoln power were computed to be $15. per kilowatt per year 
for capacity plus 3*0 mills per KWH (kilowatt-hour), equiva-
lent to 9. total cost, with the above marketing plans, of 
6.4 mills per KWH for 50^ load factor power delivered to 
load centers in Maine, and 20.1 mills per KWH for 10# load 
factor power delivered to Boston. The computation of 
these power rates is explained in the "Projeot Payout 
Schedule" section. 
The Federal Power Commission determined after examina-
tion of power costs from several types of alternatives, 
that a combination of a private conventional steam plant in 
29u.s .Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968, 
op. oit., p. 398. 
3°Ibid., p. 399. 
if 
Maine and a private pumped storage development in the 
Boston area would provide the lowest cost private alterna-
tive to the power that would be produced by the Dickey-
Lincoln project. 3 1 No publicly financed alternatives 
were considered, since no public power facilities exist in 
New England, and hypothetical sources are not considered 
valid alternatives. Fixed charges for the private alterna-
tives included interest at 7$, insurance, federal, state, 
and local taxes. 50# load factor power from the alterna-
tive private Maine baseload plant required rates of $23.50 
per kilowatt per year for capaoity plus 3.1 mills per KWH. 
The cost of power produced by the alternative private peak 
ing power facilities in the Boston area, operating at 10# 
load factor, was estimated to be $19*50 per kilowatt per 
year plus 4.5 mills per KWH. J 
It is evident from the comparisons made by the Staff 
that . . the privately financed alternates cannot com-
pete oostwise with the Federal government in providing 
Identical facilities for power supply whether it be conven-
tional steam, nuclear steam, or a pumped storage hydro 
33 development." 
In 1966, the ECC also prepared estimated costs of 
power from private source alternatives. The ECC calcula-
tion of the lowest priced alternative for 50£ load factor 
power delivered in Maine was based on the 600 megawatt 
Millstone Point nuolear plant in Connecticut, with at-market 
3iU.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 401. 
32Ibid., p. 404 33Ibid., p. 402. 
cost of $19.14 per kilowatt per year plus 1.9 mills per KWH. 
When the ECC's estimate was adjusted by the Staff to in-
clude realistic transmission costs and losses to Maine, 
however, it was increased to $25.14 per kilowatt per year 
plus 1.91 mills per KWH, which would require at-market 
rates of 7.7 mills per KWH for baseload power in Maine. 
The ECC cost estimates of alternative power costs of 
peaking power for the Boston area, based on the Northfield 
Mountain pumped-storage project in western Massachusetts, 
wae $10.91 per kilowatt per year plus 2.99 mills per KWH. 
The ECC estimate, however, included no allowance for the 
cost of the backbone transmission system needed to transmit 
power from the alternative peaking power plant. Therefore, 
the Federal Power Commission adjusted the ECC pumped stor-
age estimate to $16.82 per kilowatt per year plus 2.99 
mills per KWH, equivalent to a rate of 22.2 mills per KWH.3^ 
Using the Federal Power Commission's figures for the 
oost of power from the most economical alternatives, the 
total annual power benefit was calculated for the Staff 
report ae followsi 
Maine load factor power 
Capacity: 100,000 kilowatts at $23.50 per kilowatt per year $2,350,000 
Energy: 351.6 gigawatt-hours 36 
at 3.1 mills per K»VH 1.090.000 
Total Maine load factor power benefit $3,440,000 
3*U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 403. 
35Ibid., p. 404. 
36One gLgawatt-hour = 1,000,000 kilowatt-hours. 
.Boston peaking power 
Capacity* 623,500 kilowatts 
at $19.50 per kilowatt per year $12,158,000 
Energy: 594.5 gigawatt-hours 
at 4.5 mills per KWH 2.675.000 
Total Boston peaking power benefits $14,833,000 
Downstream energy benefits 
Energy: 175 gigawatt-hours 
at 3.0 mills per K.VH 525.000 
Total Power Benefits $18,798,000 
The "downstream" energy benefits would derive from the 
350 gigawatt-hours per year of additional energy produced 
by the hydroelectric plants located on the St. John River 
in Canada, as a result of the increased natural storage on 
the Upper St. John River provided by Dickey-Lincoln. In 
accordance with the draft treaty with Canada of May 1966, 
the United States is entitled to one half the downstream 
benefits, or 175 gigawatt-hours per year, valued at 3.0 
mills per kilowatt-hour at that time. 
Project Payout Schedule 
In order to compute the rates to be charged for power 
from Dickey-Linooln, the amount of the total project cost 
allocated to power must first be determined. The rates 
charged must be suffioient to pay back the Treasury an 
nprpmi amount for fifty years to compensate the government 
for its power investment. The oosts allocated to flood 
oontrol and area redevelopment are non-reimbursable, that 
is, power rates are not required to reoover the government 
3 U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 408. 
38Ibid., p. 409. 
Investment in the non-power aspects of the project* In 
1966, using the latest cost estimates for Dickey-Lincoln, 
the Department of the Interior calculated that 96.2?£ of the 
total project costs should be allocated to power. The 
annual project costs for power based on a 50—year period of 
analysis, at 3 1/8interest, including transmission, oper-
ation and maintenance costs, was determined by the Depart-
ment of the Interior to be $13,821,400. 
Proposed at market payout schedule 
Annual capacity: Maine - 100,000 kilowatts 
at 315 per kilowatt per year $1,500,000 
Boston - 623,500 kilowatts 
at $15 per kilowatt per year 9,352,000 
Annual energy: Maine - 438 gigawatt hours 
at 3.0 mills per KWH 1,314,000 
Boston - 672.5 gigawatt hours 
at 3.0 mills per KWH 2.017.500 
Subtotal $14,184,000 
Less: Interior administrative and marketing costs of 30.50 per kilowatt per year 361.750 
Annual project cost allocated to power $13,822,250 
Department of the Interior Proposed Marketing Plan 
Electric power generated by Dickey-Lincoln would be 
marketed by the Department of the Interior, its authority as 
marketing agent based upon the Flood Control Act of 1944. 
The rates charged for power must be the lowest possible that 
are adequate to recover the costs of producing and transmit-
ting the power, Including the amortization of the capital 
•S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 4JL4. 
40Ibid., p. 415. 
investment allocated to power. The 1944 law also states 
that preference in the sale of suoh power shall be given 
Flans to market Dickey-Lincoln power are based on the 
projected needs of New England at the time the project 
would become operational. At the time of the Staff report, 
Interior hod not officially discussed marketing plans with 
either preference customers in Maine or with private util-
ities in Massachusetts. 4 2 
Of the Dickey-Lincoln project's total capacity of 794 
megawatts. Interior planned to sell 100 megawatts of 50£ 
load factor power (100 megawatts of capacity generating 
energy for 12 hours each day) to preference customers in 
Maine• In 1965, there were two rural electric cooperatives 
and six municipal systems in Maine, with a peak demand of 
21,695 kilowatts. 4 3 It was projected that by 1975 the 
Maine preference customers demand would double, to 44,000 
kilowatts. The remaining 50$ load factor power would be 
offered to Maine private utilities on a withdrawable basis 
until 1985 when. Interior predicted, Llaine preference cus-
tomers would be able to use the total 100 megawatts allot-
ted to them. 4 4 
The major part of Dlckey-Llncoln*s capacity, 625 mega-
watts, would be sold as peaking power at 10# load factor 
(625 megawatts of capacity generating energy for approx-
imately two and one half hours each day) to private utility 
•Congress, public Works Appropriations for 1968, 
to public bodies and cooperatives 41 
op. clt», p. 420* 
42Ibid. 43Ibid., p. 416  44Ibid., p. 420 
companies in the Boston area.^ The Federal Power Commis-
sion, in 1965, predicted that this peaking power capacity 
would be needed in Bew England by 1975. over and above the 
new capacity planned by the private utilities in 1965. 
Under the Interior marketing plan, the lowest rates 
at which Dickey-Lincoln power could be sold would be, (at 
1965 prices), $15 per kilowatt per year for capacity plus 
3.0 mills per KWH for energy- This cost is equivalent to 
a "total cost" of 6.4 mills per KWH for 50£ load factor 
power, delivered to load centers in Bangor and Portland 
345-kilovolt transmission lines.^ The lowest total charge 
to Maine preference customers for Dickey-Lincoln power would 
be approximately 8.0 mills per KWH, after adding 1.5 mills 
per KWH for "wheeling" charges. In 1966, it was reported that 
Maine Rural Electric Associations and municipal systems 
paid from 11.0 mills per KWH to 19.0 mills per KWH, buying 
47 
most of their energy from the private utilities* 
The lowest total cost for Dickey-Lincoln peaking power, 
(at 10^ load factor), sold in the Boston area, was estimated 
in 1966 to be 20.1 mills per KWH, not including wheeling 
48 
charges. The Federal Power Commission, in 1966, estimated 
that the lowest cost pumped-storage alternative could pro-
duce 10$ load factor power in the Boston area for 26.8 
mills per KWH, based on charges of 319.50 per kilowatt per 49 yea for capacity plus 4.5 mills per KWH for energy. 
Congress, Public works Appropriations for 1968. Ibid., p. 421. ^g 
4?Ibid., P. 407. , q I b i d " p' Ibid., p. 404. 
Although the majority of private utilities in the 
Boston area told the Staff that they were not interested 
in Dickey-Lincoln peaking power at the forecasted rates, 
the Department of the Interior found that the proposed sell-
ing prices for Dickey-Lincoln peaking and baseload power 
were lower than the alternative power values supplied by 
the Federal Pov.er Commission, and lower than the prices 
then paid by Maine preference custoners, Therefore, 
Interior concluded that power from Dickey-Lincoln would be 
marketable since private utility companies are required to 
buy power from the least expensive source available. 
The Staff report indicated that an alternative market 
for Dickey-Lincoln peaking power would exist. Municipal 
electric systems in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Ver-
mont stated their willingness to buy, by 1975, over 600 
51 
megawatts of peaking power from Dickey-Lincoln. ' The 
Municipal Electric Association of Liassachueetts, represent-
ing 39 of the 40 Massachusetts municipal systems, told the 
Staff that in 1965 their systems had a combined peak of 
500 megawatts, and that they had purchased 1,900 glgawatt-
hours of energy. In 1965, the peak projected for these •52 An— 
Massachusetts systems by 1975 was 1,100 megawatts. ^  
cording to the Municipal Electric Association, in 1966 thsir 
systems paid an average of 12.0 mills per KWH, while the 
average national wholesale rates were 4.9 mills per KWH 
53 for power sold to municipals. 
.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 421. 
51Ibid., p. 422. 52Ibid., p. 418. 53Ibid., p.422. 
Significance of Dickey-Lincoln in Reducing Power Rates 
Dickey-Lincoln's effectiveness in reducing the cost 
of electricity to Maine and New England ratepayers lies at 
the core of the continuing controversy over the project* 
Rates paid by all classes of electric consumers in New 
England are among tho highest in the country, according to 
the Federal Power Commission, and at present 98^ of the 
power sold in New England is produced by private utility 
companies. New England's investor-owned utilities contend 
that the problem of high power rates would not be solved 
by pubic power projects, but by improving the efficiency 
of power generation by constructing an integrated system 
of modern power plants interconnected with extra-high-vol-
tage transmission lines. In 1966, the ECC told the Sub-
committee Staff that with this type of planning they would 
produce power at less cost than Dickey-Lincoln could, and 
sell it at rates 405$ lower than the rates predicted for 
Dickey-Lincoln power by 1980. 5 4 The Federal Power Commis-
sion , in its 1964 National Power Survey, also forecasted a 
reduction in New England power rates in the 1970's of 30?.,, 
resulting largely from increased consumption of electricity. 
But, the ECC admits it is almost impossible to predict 
future retail electricity prices, because " . . . even 
though the costs of power generation may be lowered, and the 
costs of power to the consumer reduced with greater consump-
tion of power, these advantages may bo offset by the demand 
5*U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. oit., p. 423* 
for underground transmission facilities and other unpre-
dictable and costly condition of power service." ^ 
In 1966, the Department of the Interior wae confident 
that the Federal project could produce power at less cost 
than comparable private projects then being constructed or 
planned for New England* The preference customers of 
Maine would benefit most directly and substantially if that 
proved to be true, since the 100 megawatts of base load 
power generated by Dickey-Lincoln would fulfill an increas-
ingly greater proportion of the needs of the preference 
systems. The 1965 Maine preference customers peak demand 
of 21,695 kilowatts was, however, only a small fraction 
of the 604,599 kilowatt peak experienced in 1963 by the 
three major private utilities of Maine. Therefore, the 
projected low rates for Dickey-Lincoln power would directly 
affect the rates of a relatively small number of Maine 
electric consumers. According to the Subcommittee Staff, 
the Department of the Interior conceded that the avail-
ability of low-cost power from Dickey-Lincoln would have 
• • only a nominal, if any, effect on the power rates of 
consumers in the Boston area if Dickey-Lincoln project peak-
Kft 
ing power is sold to the private utilities." The reason 
for this is simples private utilities would mix " . . . the 
relatively small amount of Dickey-Lincoln purchased power 
with a very large amount of power from other sources and 
sell the power to a large number of customers. The econoqy 
S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. cit., p. 425. 
* Ibid., p. 416 ''ibid., p. 419 ?0Ibid., p. 426. 
of price realized in the purchase of Dickey-Lincoln peak-
ing power is, therefore, widely dispersed and will have 
little effect on the Individual consumers." 
The "New England Business Review" reached a similar 
conclusion: ". . .the impact of new power—whether public 
or private—on electric bills of ultimate ratepayers will 
be significant, but . . . the difference in impact of public 
power proposals compared with industry plans will not be 
significant for the region as a whole." 6 0 The fact that 
the rates charged for electricity by the Maine and New 
England private utilities have not decreased as was pre-
dicted in the 1960's, but have instead dramatically in-
creased in the 1970•s, does not nullify these conclusions 
since increasing rates of inflation have escalated costs 
for the Dickey-Lincoln project. Therefore, the rates 
charged for Dickey-Lincoln power would be increased to re-
flect increasing costs in any future project payout 
analysis. 
If the Department of the Interior were able to work 
out plans for the sale of Dickey-Lincoln peaking power to 
Massachusetts preference customers, the rate reducing ef-
fect of Dickey-Lincoln power might be more marked. This 
change in the marketing plan would not produce reductions, 
however, for the average Maine ratepayer. The "New Eng-
land Business Review" suggested a redesign of the proposed 
project to better serve the needs of the inland power 
.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. olt., p. 426. 
®°Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments! Part II t op. cit., p. 16. 
market of northern New England, to maximise the rate-
reducing effects and minimize the dilution effects by con-
centrating the Dickey-Lincoln power market* In place of 
the plan to size the installed capacity of Dickey-Lincoln 
for the production of peaking power at close to COO mega-
watts, the "Business Review" study recommended the instal-
lation of capacity adequate for the generation of baseload 
power primarily* ^ 
The installed capacity of Dickey-Lincoln for peaking 
power would be comparable to the size of most of the units 
now being installed in New England* If planned for base-
load power production, the Dickey-Lincoln Installation would 
be considerably smaller, probably closer to 200 megawatts, 
Its size limited by the relatively low flows of the St* John 
River. Acceptance of the Northfleld Mountain project as a 
valid alternative to Dickey-Lincoln led the "Business Re-
view" to conclude, "It seems unlikely * * .that a market now 
exists in southern New England for the 700,000 kilowatts of 
peaking power in the present Dickey-Lincoln plan, unless 
rates are set below a level to recover costs." 
The Staff report states (and the 1964 Department of the 
Interior report also recognized this fact) that, although 
Dickey-Lincoln could be built for less than any privately-
financed alternatives, the Federal government could generate 
power at less cost than Dickey-Lincoln by other means with 
Federal financing, 6 2 Nuclear steam, conventional steam, or 
6Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments! Part II, 
op* cit., p.15. 
U.S. Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op* oit., p. 427* 
pumped storage hydro plants could all be constructed at less 
oost and produce power that could be marketed at lower rates 
than Dickey-Lincoln, according to the 1966 analysis, The 
Department of the Interior, however, has argued that Dickey-
Linooln should be considered a multi-resource development, 
as well as an electric generating projeot, and that none of 
the alternates, Federally or privately financed, could pro-
vide the non-power benefits offered by the Dickey-Lincoln 
project* There is no indication that the efficiency of 
alternative means of providing area redevelopment objectives, 
with Federal assistance, has bsen explored* 
Pumped storage was ruled out by the Corps of Engineers 
as an acceptable alternative to Dickey-Linooln peaking power* 
According to the Federal Power Commission, while Dickey-
Lincoln and pumped storage are equivalent in many ways, con-
ventional hydroelectric projects such as Dickey-Lincoln have 
certain advantages over pumped storage* For reliability of 
service, it is important that some part of the generating 
capacity of any system be able to assume additional loads 
qulokly. Hydroelectric power is best suited to providing 
rapid peaking capacity and almost instantaneous reserve for 
load protection 24 hours a day, while steam plants are only 
useful for baseload operation because they load slowly* 
Dickey-Lincoln's large volume of usable power storage 
allows for flexibility of operation for baseload reserve 
production as well. Pumped storage plants, on the other 
hand, require 3 KWH of pumping energy to produce 2 KWH 
Congress, Publio Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op* cit*, p. 399* 
64lbid., p. 437. 
of peaking energy and are unavailable for reserve capacity 
during the pumping phase. Conventional hydroelectric 
plants are also subject to fewer interruptions for repairs 
and maintenance, as compared with other types of generating 
units, because of the use of rugged machinery operating at 
low speeds and temperatures. ^ 
The Federal government could produce energy for about 
one half the cost, in every instance (steam, nuclear, 
pumped storage), of power produced by private companies. ^ 
The Department of Commerce, in its 1965 review of the 
Dickey-Lincoln project, compared the capital cost of con-
structing Dickey-Lincoln with the capital costs of other 
types of plants. The capital cost of Dickey-Lincoln, on a 
cost per kilowatt of Installed capacity basis was $277* per 
kilowatt; for a steam-electric in Boston, $125* per kilo-
watt; for steam electric in Maine, $140. per kilowatt; and 
for nuclear steam, $130. per kilowatt. The lowest capital 
cost alternative for the production of peaking power was 
68 
pumped storage at $196. per kilowatt. Operating costs 
for fuel and maintenance tend to equalize the costs of 
power produced by these plants with the cost of Dickey-
Lincoln power but, if Federally financed, their power would 
still be less expensive. In 1966, the Federal Power Com-
mission predicted that, in 1975, when Dickey-Lincoln 
would theoretically be producing power for $15* per 
6^U.S.Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. oit., p. 427. 
66Ibid. 67Ibid.t p. 395. 
^ O.S.Department of the Interior, Report to President 
Lyndon B. Johnson. July, 1965, U.S.Department of Commerce 
Review, p. 4. 
kilowatt per year plus 2.4 mills per KWH. With private 
financing, the same power was predicted to cost $26.50 per 
kilowatt per year plus 2.4 mills per KWH. Pumped storage, 
federally financed and in the Boston area, it was predicted, 
would be marketed for $8. (in 1975) per kilowatt per year, 
and 4*5 mills per kilowatt-hour, but the same project with 
private financing would require rates of $19.50 per kilo-
watt per year plus 4.5 mills per kilowatt-hour. 
The gap between the cost of equivalent Federally fi-
nanced and privately financed electric power is a result of 
the higher Interest rates and Federal, state, and local 
taxes which private utilities are obliged to pay. The in-
terest rate for Federal water resource projects, in 1966, 
was 3 l/8£ while private utilities were paying Interest 
ratee of 7/*. Federal projects aire completely tax exempt, 
but private utilities pay 15,^  of their gross revenues in 
Federal income taxes alone, and are subject to state sales 
taxes and local property taxes on plant and transmission 
facilities. Private utilities have the additional oost of 
dividend payment to investors. 
While any untaxed, Federally-financed power develop-
ment oan probably lower costs to ratepayers to some degree, 
or help to stabilize rising electric bills, in choosing a 
tax-free project in place of a private invest: jnt, the 
taxes are foregone that the private project would have paid. 
Local and State servioes, however, must still be supported. 
Therefore, to the extent that Investments by private 
•Congress, Public V.'orka Appropriations for 1968. 
op* oit., p. 399* 
70Ibid. 
utilities are displaced or deferred, the on-going tax bur-
den is shifted to other taxpayers who arc also electric 
71 
ratepayers. ' The benefit-cost method of determining 
economic feasibility has no provision for measuring the net 
benefit or cost resulting from the loss of tax revenue ver-
sus the gain to ratepayers from lowered eleotrio bills. A 
large part of the taxes paid by private utilities go to lo-
cal communities where the power facilities are located, so 
that the dollar benefits from taxes paid are not as wide-
spread as would be the dollar benefits of lower cost power 
from tax-exempt sourcee. In the oase of Dickey-Lincoln, 
any benefits of lower-cost power would be concentrated in 
the preference customers market in Maine, and it has not 
been established that rates would be lowered to the extent 
that the stimulative effect of low-cost power on the econ-
omy would compensate for the tax loss. 
A Maine private utility official pointed out, during 
the 1965 Congressional hearings on Dickey-Lincoln, that 
the construction of the Federal project would cost approx-
imately $7,650,000 annually In taxes. Eased on annual rev-
enue of $15,000,000 for Dickey-Lincoln, its tax-exempt 
status would cost $2,250,000 per year In Federal taxes and 
$3,000,000 in State sales taxes. Since investor-owned util-
ities, in 1965, paid property taxes of $1.80 per kilowatt 
each year in unorganized townships, the tax on the cap-
acity of 794,000 kilowatts at Dickey-Lincoln would amount 
71Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developmental 
Part II . . .Public Power Proposals", ITew Kn/rland Business 
Review. April, 1S66, op. cit., p. 11. 
to $1,437,000 per year. The exemption of 300 miles of 
double circuit transmission lines worth more than $65 
million, normally taxed at 1.5^, would oost $954,000 each 
year in property tax revenues. 7 2 
Almost no mention of the comparability test of econom-
ic feasibility is made in the Staff's report on Dickey-
Lincoln. Although, in 1966, the Corps of Engineers 
assigned Dickey-Lincoln a favorable benefit-cost ratio, 
73 
1.91, and an acceptable comparability ratio of 1.12, 
the adjustments made by the Department of the Interior in 
project costs subsequently reduced the benefit-cost ratio 
to 1.59. Adjusting the comparability ratio in the same 
manner reduces it from $11,605,000 t $10,390,0007* or 1.12, 
to about $11,100,000 i $12,172,400, or less than unity. 
Thus, it would seem that in 1966 all the tests for econom-
ic justification were not met by Dickey-Lincoln. 
72Bangor Daily News. August 17, 1965. 
"o.s .Congress, Public Works Appropriations for 1968. 
op. oit., p. 441. 
7*Ibid. 
PART 71 Current Planningi North Atlantic Regional Water 
Resources Study 
The North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Coordi-
nating Committee, in May 1972, published a massive report 
oovering the availability of water supplies from llaine to 
Virginia. Analyses and recommendations for the St. John 
River Basin are included. In October 1972, a "Draft En-
vironmental Impact Statement" was issued assessing environ-
mental effects of the program proposed for the St. John. 
This draft was prepared in response to the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969» wliich requires an evalu-
ation of potential environmental impacts due to major Fed-
eral actions. The Implementation of the Dickey-Lincoln 
project is one of the recommendations made in the Water Re-
sources Study. 
The North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study is 
part of a program of study of all the major river basins 
in the United States grouped into twenty regions. This 
program was established by the Water Resources Council, 
whloh was created in 1965» under the Water Reeources Plan-
ning Act, to coordinate the activities of the Federal, 
State, and local agencies engaged in planning the use of 
water resources. 1 The North Atlantic Region (NAR) study 
was directed by the Army Corps of Engineers, jut the final 
authority in the planning process was the Coordinating 
^North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordi-
nating Committee, North Atlantic Regional Water Resources 
Study. Appendix A, History of Study, toy, 1972, p. A-l. 
Committee* The membership of this body included interest-
ed Federal agencies, all tho States within the HAR, and 
the existing river basin commissions. The study attempts 
to project needs and solutions through tho year 2020* 
Three general planning objectives are taken into account: 
1) National Efficiency 
2) Environmental Quality 
3) Regional Development ^  
A "Draft Environmental Impact Statement" (DEIS) was 
prepared for each of the twenty-one Areas within the NAR, 
from the St. John River Basin to the James River Basin* 
Area #1 consists of the 7,360 square miles of the St. John 
River basin located in Maine* 
Por this Area, a program emphasizing equally the ob-
jectives of Environmental Quality and Regional Development 
was recommended in order to ". • .protect and in some ways 
improve this Area's extensive wildlands while helping to 
A 
stimulate industrial growth." The water resource manage-
ment program recommended should, therefore, "• . .preserve 
the Area's extensive scenic and recreational resources, es-
pecially in Sub-area 1-a [the western portion of the basin/ 
by limiting their economic development and maintaining their 
quality*" ** In keeping with the dual objective, however, 
it is recommended that "This preservation should be done in 
such a way, however, to allow the increasing needs of indus-6 try to be met . . •"• 
^Torth Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordi-
nating Committee, Annex to Report. Kay, 1972, op. cit., p.5. 
3Ibid., p. 22. 4 I b i d . 5 I b i d . 6Ibid., p.23* 
The needs considered most important for attaining the 
so-called "mixed" objective are listed as "• . .fish and 
wildlife, water recreation, recreational boatins, publicly 
supplied water, agricultural irrigation, and industrial 
self-supplied water," ^  the need for water quality main-
tenance being considered the key element in all cases. It 
is further stated that "Preservation and maintenance of 
unique landscapes will be necessary for meeting the visual 
and oultural needs. Provisions of such landscapes depends 
upon the retention and extension of the Area's unique wil-
o 
derness and wild streams." And on hydroelectric power: 
"Power plant cooling and hydroelectric generation needs will 
beoome relatively large during the later years of the plan-
ning period due to the growth of the paper industry and to q 
the increase in power exportation from the Area." * This 
last statement is particularly confusing since any increase 
in power exportation will be due to an increase in gener-
ating facilities Installed in the Area. 
Although hydroelectric "needs" appear to be of low 
priority• the construction of "Dickey-Lincoln Lake", Is per-
sistently advocated in the Water Resources Study* Yet, it 
is acknowledged in the DEIS that, of all the programs rec-
ommended for the St. John River Basin, "The largest and 
most widespread adverse environmental effeots would result 
ftrom the construction of Dickey-Lincoln Lake project." 1 0 
''North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordi-
nating Committee, Annex to Report, May, 1972, pp.cit., p.22. 
Ibid. 9Ibid., p.23. 
*®North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Coordi-
nating Committee, Draft' Environmental Iupact Statement, 
"Area 1 - St. John xttver Basin", October, 1972, p. 3. 
The losses of wildlife habitat, cold water fish habitat, 
the creation of a barrier to wildlife migration routes, and 
the poor aquatic and terrestrial edge habitat that would be 
caused by tho instability of reservoir water levels are 
recognized in the DEIS, but without any indication that 
their significance for the region, as woll as for the imme-
diate project area, is appreciated by the project planners* 
Some confusion surrounds the effect of the Dickey-
Lincoln project on the Allagash. 1 1 In the DEIS concern is 
Implied about whether the reservoir would bo backed up 
above Allagash Falls (". . .the downstream portion of the 
Allagash River will bo submerged.") The size of Lincoln 
School Reservoir and, therefore, the generating capacity of 
the re-regulating dam, is severely restricted by the height 
of these Falls. Any plans to utilize more fully the hydro-
electric potential of the Allagash flows would encroach 
upon the Wilderness Waterway. 
The Water Resources Study reflects a now approach to 
the promotion of Dickey-Lincoln by the Army Corps of Engi-
neers* The hydroelectric project is referred to as being 
primarily a multiple-purpose storage project which would 
". . .directly or indirectly fulfill a broad array of human 
needs, among which are hydroelectric power, flood control, 
low flow augmentation for water quality, public and indus-
trial self-supplied water and irrigation*" The Dickey-
Richard Rothe, New England River Basins Commission, 
"Memorandum: Comments on IT Ah Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement"* December 1972. 
i2North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Co-
ordinating Committee, op. cit., p* 11. 
13Ibid.# p. 8. 
Lincoln project, authorized in 1965, was credited with ben-
efits from only two of these sources, hydroelectric power 
and flood control. 
While it is admitted that most of the noeds cited 
above could be met by other water management devices such 
as small upstream impoundments, it is stated . .fulfill-
ment of hydroelectric power generation and water quality 
maintenance needs all require a mainstream reservoir by the 
year 2000." 1 4 In addition, such a reservoir cculd . . 
reduce the initial capital investment that would be ncces-
sary for the individual needs of water quality maintenance, 
hydroelectric power generation, irrigation water, recre-
ational boating, water recreation • • ^ Dickey-Lincoln 
Is depicted as being not only necessary to meet energy needs 
of the future, but also as having the potential to fulfill, 
in a single multi-purpose project, many other future water 
resource needs. In the absence of a large mainstream reser-
voir to meet the predicted demands, the development of sev-
eral single-purpose devices might cumulatively cost more 
than the Dickey-Lincoln project, according to the Water Re-
sources Study. This attempt to broaden the cost basis of 
Dickey-Lincoln may be valid if the projections of the future 
water resource needs are sound. However, the need for some 
Of these services, such as extensive agricull jral irriga-
tion in northern Maine, is open to debate. 
*%orth Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Co-
ordinating Committee, Annex 1 to Report, p. 25. 
15Ibid. 
A thread of unresolved conflict between the need for. 
the services of a large multiple purpose reservoir on the 
Upper St. John and the need to preserve the area for its 
wilderness values, runs throughout the Water Resources 
Study and DEIS study of the western portion of the Upper 
St. John River- According to the DEIS, "Area 1 contains 
• • .the only remaining large wilderness area in the North 
Atlantic Region.% The Water Resources Study states 
that "the mixed objective plan stresses a preservation ap-
proach to most of the area, recognizing its unique wilder-
17 
ness value."- ' In the light of these statements, the 
recommendation for the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln 
dam, or any other "large mainstream reservoir" which would 
physically obliterate the core of this wilderness, seems 
downright contradictory- But, the Water Resources Study 
also states "This Area has the only reservoir storage site 
in the North Atlantic Region which combines a large cap-
acity for in-stream power generation with a large amount of 18 
permanent storage for other needs." According to the 
Coordinating Committee, the Upper St. John River is the 
last reservoir site remaining in the Northeast with large 19 hydro potential. 
The negative environmental effects of Dickey-Lincoln 
cited in the DEIS would seem to far outweigh the benefits, 
since each of the "needs" which would be met by the power 
16North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study Co-
ordinating Committee, Annex 1 to Report, op. cit., p. 21. 
17{bid., Draft Environmental Impact Statement, p.11. 
18Ibid., Annex 1 to Report, P'23* 
^Ibid., Appendix P-Power. p. P-57. 
dam and reservoir oould be fulfilled by other means at 
other sites, inoluding the generation of electric power. 
Nevertheless, the fact oannot be ignored that, if eaoh of 
the "needs" identified for the St. John River Basin in the 
Water Resources Study is valid and must be met, they will 
be fulfilled at other sites if the Dickey-Linooln project 
is not built, and the alternative devices will aleo have 
some effect on the environment, possibly cumulatively Dore 
damaging than Dickey-Lincoln. The environmental impact 
statement is a draft, and is, presumably, subject to 
change. Re-evaluation of that portion of the DSIS dealing 
with Dickey-Lincoln has been recommended by the I.Taine 
State Planning Office. 2 0 
Philip tf. Savage, Maine State Planning Director, corres-
pondence with Harry E. Schwarz, Executive Secretary North 
Atlantic Division, Corps of Engineers, December 11, 1972, 
p. 1. 
Conclusion - Die key-Lincoln in the 1970's r-nd the Prospects 
for the Upper St. John River 
Because Congress has annually refused appropriations 
since 1967, the Dickey-Lincoln project is generally thought 
to be a "dead" issuo. The North Atlantic Regional Water Re« 
sources Study indicates, on the c o n t r a r y , that from the cur-
rent perspective of the Corps of Engineers, Dickey-Lincoln 
Is very much alive as the key feature of a comprehensive 
water resources development program for the St. John River 
Basin. Furthermore, the "Hathaway plan", proposing a small-
er-scale Federal hydroelectric installation and revised mar-
keting plan with agricultural irrigation included as an 
additional non-power project benefit, has won over much of 
the former Congressional opposition to Dickey-Lincoln. 
Also, proponents of the creation of a Power Authority of 
Maine have not ruled out a St. John hydroelectric project. 
Its predecessor, the 1965 proposal for a Kaine Power 
Authority, was based on well-developed plans for a hydro-
electric dam on the St. John River at Big Rapids, a few 
miles above the Dickey site. 
Other types of development may pose a future threat 
to the Upper St, John wilderness as well. Although paper 
company domination of the watershed has been largely re-
sponsible for its present unsettled wilderness state, un-
sound timber harvesting practices and recreational develop-
ment of timberland holdings could be as damaging to the 
wild qualities of the area as a hydroeleotric project. 
A combination of circumstances currently prevails 
JLU X 
which tends to make Dickey-Lincoln hydroelectric energy 
more attractive than ever. Despite the achievement of 
many private utility goals for integrating new England's 
electric systems, the rate reductions predicted in the mid-
1960*8 for Maine have not materialized. Instead, rate in-
creases of approximately 9$ were granted in 1972 hy the 
Maine Public Utilities Commission to the three major pri-
vate elcctric utilities serving Maine. Additional substan-
tial increases will probably be requested in 1974. Fuel 
shortages resulting in rising fuel prices and uneasiness 
about overdependence on foreign oil supplies may revive in-
terest in the reliable qualities of hydro power. Delays in 
nuclear plant licensing and increasing difficulty in siting 
thermal and nuclear power plants tends to increase the 
appeal of the already-authorized Dickey-Lincoln project to 
those concerned about the inadequacy of utility company 
plans for meeting future demands. The natural advantages 
of the use of a "clean", renewable resource such as hydro 
power versus methods of power production entailing the con-
sumption of fossil fuels and the attendant pollution prob-
lems add further attraction to Dickey-Lincoln. In addition, 
some environmentalists have advocated the Dickey-Lincoln 
project on the grounds it would give !-!aine the electrical 
self-sufficicncy to resist the anticipated wa-e of construc-
tion in Maine of huge generators primarily intended to pro-
duce power for export south to the flew England Power Pool 
network. 1 
^Editorial, Maine Timos. September 6, 1971. 
The original objective of developing the Dickey-
Lincoln project was to reduce the exceptionally nigh Kew 
England power rates. Yet it is not clear, on the basis of 
the economic justification used by the Department of the 
Interior, and on which Congress authorized the project, 
that Dickey-Lincoln is the most efficient means of achiev-
ing that objective, or that Dickey-Lincoln power would 
have any impact on the average Maine ratepayer's electric 
bill, because of the marketing restrictions on Federally 
developed power. And, if rate reduction is the most impor-
tant consideration, perhaps a combination of closer Public 
Utilities Commission regulation of the private electrical 
Industry and an extension of the tax subsidies to private 
utilities from which public projects automatically benefit 
would achieve that purpose more quickly, on the other hand 
rate reductions accomplished by tax subsidy for private or 
public power developments do not necessarily bonefit tho 
ratepayer-tax-payer. A new economic analysis of Dickey-
Lincoln, taking these factors into account, cased on cur-
rent costs and prices, would be required to demonstrate its 
current economic justification. 
The question then arises as to whether Dickey-Lincoln 
power could be integrated with private industry p^ans for 
improving the efficiency of power generation, o; if the in-
troduction of competition in a natural monopoly situation 
2 may not come at a sacrifice in efficiency. 
Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments: 
Part II . . -Public Power Proposals", op. cit., p. 17. 
the NEP00L (New England Power Pool) agreement, awaiting ap-
proval by the Federal Power Commission, would bar publicly-financed utilities from using the extra-high-voltage trans-
mission grid developed by New England*s private utilities, 
which is crucial to inter system electrical coordination, 3 
Dickey-Lincoln was planned and authorized before the 
days when environmental impact was a major concern. A re-
appraisal of the entire project should seriously weigh the 
environmental and social cost of obliterating "the irre-
placeable natural resource of the present St. John River 
watercourse and its adjacent 88,600 aores of streams and 
timbered beauty", 4 which provide a natural reserve area 
for Maine wildlife, a valuable timber industry resource, 
and a high-quality natural recreational area of growing 
value to the urban Northeast 
But, if the Federal project is not built, the growing 
power market will demand that the electricity be supplied 
by other means. Since every means of electrical generation 
currently in use has inherent environmental costs, to re-
ject Dickey-Lincoln is to shift the environmental looses 
to other sites, where they will take different forms. With 
this dilemma in mind, tlie basic question is whether the 
Upper St. John is more important for its unique value as an 
integral component of the last great wilderness of the 
Northeast, or for its value as the last significant hydro-
electric site remaining in the Northeaet. This decision 
3Sam Barouch, CCT£EAT, personal interview, February, 
1973.. 
^Wilkinson, "New England's Power Developments: Part II . • . Publio Power Proposals", op. oit., p. 17. 
should be made within the framework of a oomprehensive ener-
gy policy for the state. If it is not, construction of the 
Dickey-Lincoln projeot would Just be another random, short-
term solution to a predictable, long-term problem. 
The North Atlantic Regional Water Resources Study rec-
ognized the value of the St. John for both purposes, and 
reoommended development of its hydroeleotrio potential. 
That study reveals an attitude of inevitability toward the 
construction of Dickey-Lincoln on the part of the Corps of 
Engineers, and a willingness to persevere until funds are 
appropriated for the completion of planning. Thus, unless 
those who favor the preservation of the Upper St. John's 
wilderness values are prepared to fight a perennial battle 
indefinitely against Dickey-Llnooln, they must develop an 
equally substantial plan to Implement their proposals. 
Such a plan, to create a St. John Wilderness Waterway 
by Ingenious resolution of the public lots issue, was pro-
posed by Congressman Peter Kyros in February, 1973. The 
Upper St. John Ilea entirely within the unorganized town-
ships, except for the Allagash Plantation. When these town-
ships were laid out an area of land, generally 1,000 acres, 
was reserved for public ownership, to be ueed for the sup-
port of the ministry and the schools after these townships 
were settled and had organized local governments. About 
1850, timber and grass cutting rights were sold for a nom-
inal sum, to lumber companies on almost all the publio lots. 
The potential of the 400,000 acres of publio reserved 
lands was brought to the publio's attention in 1972, and 
the State Attorney General's Offioe performed a study of 
the status of the State's ownership rights and ways by 
which the state could reassert its olaims to these lands* 
A special legislative Public Lands Committee wae created 
in 1973 to hear bills proposing various ways of resolving 
the publio lands controversy and to study ways in which 
these publio lands could be used to the best advantage of 
Maine people* 
Sixteen unorganized townships span the length of the 
Upper St. John, from Baker Lake to the Allagaeh Plantation* 
In all but three of these townships, the public lots are 
unlocated. that is, they have never been surveyed and laid 
out on the ground. As envisioned by the Kyros plan, theee 
unlocated lota would be located along the Upper St. John in 
such a manner that they would form a continuous corridor 
along either side of the river. In the three townships 
where the public lots have been located previously, reloca-
tion of the lots would be necessary* The width of the 
atrip of publio lands would vary from township to township, 
since a fixed acreage (1,000 acres) would be divided over 
varying lengths of river footage* The average width of 
the strip would exceed 500 feet on either side of the river, 
and would n9t be less than 358 feet in any townehip, as cal-
culated in the Kyros plan. Not on^y would this plan pro-
tect the Upper St. John River for the people of Maine, but 
it would require no expenditure of funds for land acquisi-
tion of the approximately 15,690 aores of publio lots 
involved. 
5fj0OTQ Pflionnn from Congressman Peter Kyros, First Dis-trict, Maine, Washington Office, Friday, March 23, 1973. 
The implementation of the Kyros plan must await the 
resolution of the entire issue of the ownership and use of 
the public lots. No matter what the special committee rec-
ommends, or what course the legislature takes, the publio 
lote issue will be finally resolved in the courts, which may 
take years. ^  
The Maine Land Use Regulation Commission's (LURC) 
authority to zone the 10.5 million acres of wildlands in the 
unorganized territory has the potential to provide some de-
gree of protection to the Upper St. John. Interim zoning 
standards are now being formulated to protect the wildlands 
from further unplanned development, based on three land-use 
dletriots. In the protection district, special permits are 
required for cutting and development is strictly controlled. 
Included in this district would be the lands 250 feet back 
from "significant" streams. The interim zoning will be fol-
lowed by permanent zoning after development of a comprehen-
sive plan. UJRC zoning would not, however, override a vote 
of Congress to fund construction of the Dickey-Lincoln Pro-
jeot, nor could it Insure future public use of the adjacent 
riverlands. It is apparent that LURC with its current 
authority, cannot Insure the continued availability of this 
wilderness area for Maine citizens. 
Although it will not be possible to implement the 
Kyros plan immediately, it does fulfill the need for a sub-
stantial plan and management proposal for the use of the 
^Newa Release from Cpngressman Peter t&roe, March 23, 
1973, op. cit. 
Upper St. John that oan be held up ae a concrete alter-
native to the Dickey-Lincoln project. Obviously, serious 
consideration of protective measures for the St. John is 
oertain to spark more vigorous promotion of the project. 
The full-scale Dickey-Lincoln project clearly could not co-
exist with a St. John Wilderness Waterway such as Congress-
man Kyros proposes. Whether or not a conflict exists be-
tween the Hathaway plan variation of the Die key-Lincoln 
project and the Kyros plan for preserving the St. John will 
be demonstrated by the feasibility studies now in progress. 
Until engineering studies do demonstrate the degree of con-
flict, these two proposals must be weighed as alternative 
usee of the Upper St. John. Congressman Kyros' creative 
approach to the preservation of this remarkable Maine river 
through the use of the public lots deserves the attention 
end the same consideration that the Dickey-Lincoln project 
has received. The Dickey-Lincoln project should not be re-
newed without a thorough reappraisal of its economic bene-
fit for the people of Maine and its environmental and 
social costs. 
Hie climate of opinion in Maine favors the Dickey-
Lincoln project as a means of lowering power rates and 
stimulating economic growth in the state. These expecta-
tions are largely based upon promises made by advocates of 
the project, that Dickey-Lincoln would assure low-cost power 
for all the people of Maine. In reality, the vaet majority 
of Maine people would receive abeolutely no economic 
benefit from construction of the hydroelectric project. 
No general reduction in electrical rates would occur 
if Diokey-Linooln were built, beoause the relatively email 
number of Maine preference customers would be entitled to 
receive the 100,000 kilowatts of baseload capaoity . Even 
the eouthern New England customers buying Diokey-Linooln 
peaking power through private utility distributors would 
not find their power rates reduoed since the new power 
would be mixed with large quantities of power from other 
sources and the rate-reducing effect diluted substantially. 
Vast amounts of inexpensive power from Dickey-Lincoln would 
not be generally available, so the project would not serve 
to attract industry to Maine. The evidence that the projeot 
is the best way to revitalize the economy of northern Maine 
is questionable. Certainly more effioient means of accom-
plishing this objective could be found than the construction 
of a $500 million power development. Also, it is unlikely 
that any rate reduction resulting from the project would 
be more equitably distributed than the tax increase that 
would be generated by the project. Only a limited number 
of Maine people (preference customers) would directly 
benefit from lower-cost power from Dickey-Linooln, but the 
tax burden from whloh the Federal projeot would be exempted 
would be distributed over all classes of taxpayers, who 
are also ratepayers, but who would not all benefit from 
rate reductions. 
The environmental consequences of the proposed Diokey-
Lincoln project would be profound. The Upper St. John River 
would be devastated. The trout flshezy would be destroyed 
in the project area and damaged upstream. Its value for 
wilderness canoe-camping would be nullified. 110,000 aoree 
of wildlife habitat would be obliterated by the reservoir, 
an area that has been of particular importance as a natural 
wildlife reserve. The displacement of the wildlife inhabit-
ing the project area is expected to have a significant 
secondary impact on the populations of animals outside the 
immodiate projeot area, causing an over-all decline in 
populations of all species in the Upper St. John region. 
The most severe blow would be dealt to the deer population, 
einoe 13,000 acres of deer yarding areas, which support 
deer from the entire region, would be inundated. At the 
same time, the Diokey-Lincoln reservoir facility would open 
up this section of the wlldlands to greater numbers of 
people, increasing hunting and fishing pressures. 
In the absence of any demonstrable economic benefits 
to Maine people from the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln 
projeot, these drastic environmental consequences are tin-
justifiable. The Federal projeot would produoe less than 
of New England's total eleotrlcal requirements at the 
present time. It would consume, however, the last wild 
eeotion of the St. John River, a core area of what hae been 
called the only remaining large wilderness in the Northeaet. 
The conetruction of the Dickey-Lincoln project on the Upper 
St. John River would squander a unique wilderness river, 
of ever-increasing value to the people of the etate, the 
region, end the nation. 
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